

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MARCH, 1974

GREAT BRITAIN, 1974

BRITISH POLITICS: "A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES"	
	<i>Michael Hodges</i> 97
THE BRITISH ECONOMY: ON THE EDGE OF THE PRECIPICE	
	<i>Rodney J. Morrison</i> 101
BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH	<i>John Chadwick</i> 106
BRITAIN AND EUROPE: A NEW RELATIONSHIP?	<i>Richard H. Leach</i> 111
BRITAIN AND IRELAND: DILEMMAS IN THE BRITISH BALKANS	
	<i>Arthur Campbell Turner</i> 116
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES	<i>Peter Lyon</i> 121
BOOK REVIEWS • <i>On the United Kingdom</i>	125
CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>The Sunningdale Communiqué on Ireland</i>	128
	• <i>President Nixon's State of the Union Message</i>
	131
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	136
MAP • <i>The British Isles</i>	Inside Back Cover

Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MARCH, 1974
VOLUME 66 NUMBER 391

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

JOAN B. ANTELL

JEAN B. TOLL

Editorial Assistant

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

State University of New York

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Columbia University, Emeritus

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY

Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Portland State University

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., 4225 Main St., Box 4647, Phila., Pa. 19127. Second class postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright © 1974, by Current History, Inc.

Coming Next Month

CANADA, 1974

In our April, 1974, issue, seven articles evaluate the problems facing Canada in the 1970's. Articles include:

Canada in the Mid-Seventies: An Overview

by RICHARD H. LEACH, Duke University

The Surge of Nationalism in Canada Today

by KENNETH M. GLAZIER, The University of Calgary

The Canadian Far North

by ROBERT M. BONE, University of Saskatchewan

Quebec in Canada

by HENRY ALBINSKI, Pennsylvania State University

Developing Regionalism in the Maritime and Western Provinces

by THOMAS A. LEVY, Dalhousie University

Canadian Politics

by PETER REGENSTRIEF, University of Rochester

The Canadian Economy

by ALBERT BRETON, University of Toronto

\$1.00 a copy • \$9.50 a year

Canada \$10.00 a year • Foreign \$10.50 a year

Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

Current History

MARCH, 1974

VOL. 66, NO. 391

How serious is the crisis in Great Britain? In this issue, six articles explore the problems facing Britain today. Analyzing the political situation, our first article notes that: "Rightly or wrongly, the British electorate sees little difference between the two major parties on fundamental issues . . . volatility of support for political parties has been accompanied by an unprecedented degree of disenchantment with party politics and widespread indifference as to which party controls the corridors of power."

British Politics: "A Plague on Both Your Houses"

BY MICHAEL HODGES

Lecturer in Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Kent at Canterbury

THE MAJOR PROBLEM confronting British politicians of all parties at the present time is the increasing popular dissatisfaction with parliamentary government and a growing cynicism about the very nature of political activity. This sense of political alienation is evident not only among extremists of both right and left, but also among political moderates who have been the major justification for the "consensus politics," which has characterized the British political system over the last 20 years. The conduct of politics during this period has been based on conflict between two major parties—Labour and Conservative—which is sufficiently serious to appear significant (and thus generate relatively stable political loyalty), but not so bitter as to undermine the willingness of minorities to accept majority decisions. The result has been that minority parties have had little opportunity to challenge the dominance of the two major parties, which have concentrated on wooing the small number of uncommitted voters in the center of the political spectrum in order to tip the balance in their favor.

This battle between Labour and the Conservatives for the vital center of British politics has thus produced a marked degree of consensus on major political issues. The Labour party has tended to tone down the commitment contained in clause four of its constitution to gain public ownership over the means of production, distribution, and exchange, while the Conservative party has stressed its commitment to the principle of

the welfare state. Rightly or wrongly, the British electorate sees little difference between the two major parties on fundamental issues, and is increasingly inclined to switch its support to the party which promises the greatest short-term material benefits. This volatility of support for political parties has been accompanied by an unprecedented degree of disenchantment with party politics and widespread indifference as to which party controls the corridors of power.

Beneath this apparent apathy there are signs of growing frustration, which is expressed in ways which bypass normal political channels, such as bombings, lightning strikes, and the increasing use of intimidation and physical violence. Even groups with no previous record of militancy (such as postmen, electricity engineers and ambulance drivers) have expressed their lack of confidence in normal channels of negotiation and reconciliation by taking strike action; during the first three and one-half years of Prime Minister Edward Heath's Conservative administration industrial unrest has led to a proclamation of a state of national emergency on five occasions. At the end of 1973, for example, the energy crisis precipitated by the Middle East conflict was aggravated when the coal miners, train drivers and electricity workers took industrial actions which caused widespread unemployment and short-time working throughout British industry.

The root of this malaise undoubtedly lies in Britain's poor economic performance in the post-war era; although real incomes have risen considerably, they

have been increasingly eroded by inflation and have failed to satisfy rising expectations. In such a situation, the quality of political leadership is of crucial importance, since expectations can only be satisfied by a redistribution of resources in accordance with a set of clearly articulated national political goals. Public opinion, however, has failed to discern any such articulation of national purpose; and there has been widespread criticism that Britain is ruled by an "establishment" devoid of imagination and dynamic leadership, concerned only with the perpetuation of its own privileges and obsolete ideals, and lurching from one crisis to another.

As the political unrest of May, 1968, in France clearly indicated, economic prosperity does not dispel (and may even increase) the popular sense of alienation from the political system; a poll of British voters in 1973 showed that only one voter in ten was satisfied with the leadership provided by the two major parties, and that only one-third of the electorate felt a strong sense of commitment to a political party. The danger of this disenchantment with party politics is that it jeopardizes the delicate balance underpinning "consensus politics," and provides justification for extremists in both major political parties to inject a more explicit ideological content into party politics, in the hope of awakening dormant political loyalties. In recent months, the left wing of the Labour party has advocated a bold pursuit of socialist principles, including state control of the most important sectors of the economy, in order to regain working class support; similarly, the right wing of the Conservative party has urged the Heath administration to seek a showdown with the trade unions by confronting them with a choice between cooperation or mass unemployment.

Of these two concurrent developments, the rightist threat is of much greater political significance, given the predominantly conservative disposition of the British electorate. If a general election is held in 1974 (as seemed likely at the time this article went to press) on the issue of "who rules the country—the government or the unions?" the prospect of a breakdown in the cooperation between the Conservative government and Labour opposition, vital for the smooth working of parliamentary democracy, is very real. Such inter-party strife would indeed have serious consequences, particularly in the case of such explosive political problems as the situation in Northern Ireland, where a strong bipartisan consensus in Westminster has provided a powerful incentive for the Catholic and Protestant factions to make the new Ulster Assembly function effectively.

The increasing volatility of political support for the two major political parties in Britain was best demonstrated by the general election of June, 1970, when the Conservatives gained a wholly unexpected victory over the governing Labour party after trailing as much

as 20 points behind them in the opinion polls of the previous year. The Conservative victory was widely interpreted as a personal triumph for Edward Heath and a vote of no confidence in the six years of Harold Wilson's premiership. But it was also an "unpopularity contest" between the two major parties, producing the lowest turnout of voters in 35 years, with only 72 percent of the electorate registering their votes. Certainly the election campaign did not stimulate great interest in political affairs, since it concentrated on such specific issues as the rise in the cost of bacon under the Labour government, rather than on central issues such as British entry into the Common Market. The Conservative party pledged itself to "government without gimmicks," with economic growth entrusted to the competitive forces of the free market, and to a reduction in taxation, to be achieved by cuts in public expenditure. The Conservatives stressed the necessity for "law and order," in particular a reform of trade union laws to curb strikes and to make trade unions legally responsible for the damage caused by the actions of their members. They contrasted their position with the ignominious retreat of the Wilson government in 1969, when it dropped its proposed industrial relations bill in the face of opposition from the trade unions, whence most of the Labour party's campaign funds were derived. Edward Heath, partly to appease the Conservative extremists identified with Enoch Powell, also promised to restrict immigration by ending the preferential treatment of Commonwealth immigrants (who were mainly Asian by this time). The Labour party stressed the economic achievements of the Wilson administration, particularly the healthy balance-of-payments surplus which had been built up since the devaluation of sterling in November, 1967, but the party was somewhat vague about its future plans, nationalization in particular.

THE ELECTION OF 1970

The election campaign was dominated by the party leaders, who held daily press conferences and gave public speeches with suitably italicized paragraphs for inclusion in television news programs. Many critics saw the election as a pseudo-presidential one rather than as a fight between parliamentary political parties. Wilson wanted a mandate to build on the economic foundations laid by his administration, but the credibility of his claim was undermined by the memory of the way in which the economy had been subjected to a juddering series of stop-go policies in order to defend sterling against the depredations of the mythical "gnomes of Zurich"; and Heath's warnings of a new economic crisis were strengthened by the publication of disastrous trade figures just three days before the election. In the event, the electorate gave grudging support to Heath, even though he seemed to spring from the same technographic mold as his rival (the

pro-Labour mass-circulation *Daily Mirror* dubbed him "the sorcerer's apprentice") and was largely content to point out the mistakes that Labour had made rather than spell out how he would fulfill the promise (which he was later to regret) to "cut prices at a stroke." The election was not so much a triumph for the Conservatives as a defeat for Labour, mainly because a large number of Labour's supporters had been disillusioned by its abandonment of its previous election pledges (as a result of the economic crises that dogged the Wilson administration throughout its six years in power) and did not go out to vote on election day.

If the Conservatives won the 1970 general election by default, Heath at least could feel that it was a victory akin to United States President Harry Truman's triumph in 1948. Prior to the election, the extremist Powellite wing of the Conservative party had threatened to oust Heath if Labour won, but Heath felt sufficiently confident of his party's majority in the House of Commons to exclude Powellites from his ministerial appointments. The new Prime Minister consciously avoided the "first hundred days" type of drama which had characterized his predecessor's entry into office, and kept a very low profile; he rarely appeared on television, and did not give a televised press conference until he had been in office for more than two years.

Nevertheless, the first few months of his premiership were marked by an impressive amount of activity, with the creation of two new superdepartments (one for the Environment, the other for Trade and Industry) out of half a dozen smaller ones, the commencement of negotiations for British entry into the Common Market, and the announcement of substantial cuts in personal and corporate taxation. In October, 1970, Heath told the Conservative party's annual conference: "We were returned to office to change the course and the history of this nation, nothing else"; at the same time, the Minister for Trade and Industry, John Davies, made it clear that the Conservative government rejected the paternalistic role of the state in economic affairs in favor of economic self-reliance: "I will not bolster up or bail out companies where I can see no end to the process of propping them up." Unwillingness to support industrial "lame ducks" was accompanied by a zeal for reducing public expenditure, producing such controversial measures as the abandonment of free milk for schoolchildren, the increase in charges for medical prescriptions and dental work, and the imposition of entrance fees for museums and art galleries.

Heath made it clear that government intervention in the determination of prices and incomes was an unacceptable alternative to the free market mechanism, and abolished the Prices and Incomes Board which the Labour government had established to combat

inflation. As he said in a television interview in November, 1970:

People must face up to their own responsibilities; employers have responsibilities, so do the trade unions' leaders and trade unionists . . . the alternative to accepting responsibilities is for the government to compel the people, but what the government is trying to do is to solve the country's problems in a free society.

It soon became clear, however, that the Conservative government was unable to prevent crippling industrial unrest; the strike figures for 1970 were the worst since 1926. Twice during its first six months in office the Heath administration was obliged to declare a state of emergency: the first as the result of a prolonged strike by longshoremen in July, 1970; the second because of a "work to rule" by electricity workers in the following December. The public outcry, which was caused by the electricity blackouts (coming hard on the heels of a strike by garbage collectors), was accompanied by assaults on recalcitrant power workers by angry citizens, and this strengthened Heath's determination to bring law and order into industrial relations.

The Industrial Relations Act, which became law in 1971 after 450 hours of prolonged and bitter debate in Parliament, provided for legally enforceable labor contracts, made trade unions responsible for damage caused by members, and gave the government power to introduce a 60-day cooling-off period to prevent negotiations being hindered by strikes. Although the act also gave workers some rights they had not hitherto possessed, such as safeguards against unfair dismissal, the trade union movement saw the act as an attempt to "clobber" them, and staged a series of one-day protest strikes during the passage of the legislation through Parliament. This was followed by a continuing union policy of total noncooperation with the National Industrial Relations Court established under the act (despite heavy fines imposed on the unions by the court for contempt), and a tacit abandonment of the act by the Heath administration in 1972, when it intervened to release five dockers from jail sentences for contempt in order to end a national dock strike. The failure of the Conservative government to improve industrial relations through legislation did nothing to inspire public confidence in the Heath administration, and served only to poison relations between the unions and the government.

THE IMMIGRATION ACT

Similarly, the attempt by the Conservatives to fulfill another of their election pledges—to restrict immigration into Britain—was of little effect. The 1971 Immigration Act abolished the distinction between Commonwealth citizens and aliens, making it necessary for all immigrants to obtain work permits prior to their arrival except for "patrials" with a parent or grand-

parent born in Britain, who would retain automatic right of entry. The object of the act was to restrict colored immigration without the explicit introduction of a color bar; hence the "patrial" clause which prevented free access to Britain by Asians and black Africans and West Indians, who were less likely than white Commonwealth citizens to have had a parent or grandparent born in Britain. The act was intended to appease the right wing of the Conservative party identified with the views of Enoch Powell, who feared that many British industrial cities would be taken over by a sub-proletariat of colored immigrants (who in fact constituted less than two percent of the working population). It was criticized by other politicians of all parties, not only because of its discriminatory character, but also because it was inconsistent with Common Market regulations governing freedom of movement of workers.

Indeed, the Immigration Act had to be substantially amended before Britain joined the European Community, and even earlier it was shown to be of dubious utility. When President Idi Amin of Uganda expelled 25,000 Ugandan Asians holding British passports in the fall of 1972, the British government was obliged to set up resettlement camps throughout the country to deal with the massive influx of refugees, leading Powell to castigate the Heath administration for "a precipitate acceptance of an unqualified duty." The relatively quiescent public attitude toward the Asian refugees, however, did indicate that the race issue emphasized by the Powellites was not so important as Powell had thought. Nonetheless, the episode served to demonstrate the inability of the Heath government to adhere to its declared principles in the face of unexpected events.

The most dramatic reversal of Conservative policy came early in 1971, when Rolls-Royce went bankrupt and the Heath administration (for all its earlier stress on "lame ducks" standing on their own feet) was forced to take over the company. Wilson and his Labour colleagues made the most of this sudden conversion of the Conservatives to the principle of state ownership, but there was no real disagreement between the two sides that nationalization of Rolls-Royce was the only way to maintain a British capability in the aero-engine field. Wilson's performance with regard to the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community (Common Market, or EEC) was rather less impressive. The negotiations had commenced in July, 1970, with the Heath administration using briefs which had in fact been prepared by the Labour government; but when the final terms of entry were announced in July, 1971, Wilson not only attacked the terms obtained, but also the wisdom of British membership in the European Community. This abrupt reversal of policy on Wilson's part (largely prompted by the need to keep the anti-Market left

wing of his party under control), strengthened popular suspicion that he was a political opportunist, particularly since George Thomson—who had been Labour's chief EEC negotiator in 1967 and was later to become a member of the EEC Commission—stated that the terms obtained by the Conservative government were the best possible in the circumstances, and would have been acceptable to Labour in 1967.

The issue of British membership in the Common Market split both the Labour and Conservative ranks, making unlikely allies of right-wing isolationists, who feared a loss of British sovereignty, and left-wing socialists, who saw the Common Market as a capitalist conspiracy. Although the Heath administration attempted to educate the public on the issues involved through the distribution of pamphlets on the terms of entry and the objectives of the Common Market, there was a general air of public boredom on a subject which had been debated sporadically for the past decade. Nevertheless, the House of Commons rose to the occasion discussing the terms of entry in a six-day debate notable for its high quality and level of attendance; on October 28, 1971, the Commons approved the government's decision to join the European Community by a majority of 112 votes, with 39 Conservatives voting against the government and 69 Labour M.P.'s (including Roy Jenkins, the deputy leader of the party) voting with the Heath administration. This impressive parliamentary majority was a triumphant vindication of Heath's entire political career—in his maiden speech 20 years earlier he had advocated British participation in the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the Common Market—but many bitter parliamentary wrangles were to take place before the European Communities Act was passed in October, 1972, just three months before Britain became a member of the European Community in January, 1973.

RAMPANT INFLATION

These debates took place against a background of rampant inflation, growing unemployment, and serious industrial unrest; when Britain signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Community in January, (Continued on page 134)

Michael Hodges also teaches at the Centre for Contemporary European Studies of the University of Sussex and will be Visiting Lecturer in the Department of International Relations, Lehigh University, from the end of March, 1974. He is the editor of *European Integration* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972) and the author of *Multinational Corporations and National Government: A Case Study of the United Kingdom Experience 1964-70* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), as well as several articles on integration theory and foreign investment.

"Britain's basic problem is not the energy shortage; it is inflation. The task facing Heath is to stop that inflation. Nothing less than the survival of the nation's economy is at stake."

The British Economy: On the Edge of the Precipice

BY RODNEY J. MORRISON

Associate Professor of Economics, Wellesley College

THAT POLITICAL ECONOMY involves solving problems in the face of binding constraints was never clearer than in Britain in 1973. Each turn in the government's economic policy, either to increase employment and income or to stabilize prices, was made with the knowledge that success in one area would most assuredly raise problems in another. Most economies face this same problem. For the British, however, there is an additional constraint, one that appears to affect them far more seriously than it does others: the balance of payments.

Another lesson provided by Britain in 1973 was the abruptness with which an economy can go into reverse. Despite the historian's inclination to see change as smooth and gradual, the deterioration of economic conditions in Great Britain in 1973 can only be classified as sharp and discontinuous. As cost-push inflation intensified, it became increasingly clear that perhaps only a Cromwellian solution would suffice. Analyzing this situation, one London School of Economics professor observed:

We are threatened for the first time in human history with a *cantering cost inflation* [italicized in the original]. . . . Our choice is either to let it rip forever or sharply to restrain it. We can only do this by massive unemployment or strong anti-union measures up to and including the installation of a Communist government. It will probably not slow down of its own accord.¹

Indeed, by early 1974, economic conditions in Great Britain established three incontrovertible facts: (1) economic policy is truly a problem in constrained maximization (or minimization), (2) the balance of payments can still exert a significant influence on the domestic economy, and (3) sharp and sudden turnarounds are all too possible. Additionally, the government of Prime Minister Edward Heath has discovered that, despite the palliatives offered by an incomes policy, stern contractionary measures are still

necessary if a cost-push inflation is to be defeated. Once again it has been demonstrated that price and wage controls deal only with the symptoms of inflation. They do not treat its causes. This is especially true when controls are imposed on an economy at the same time that it is being given massive doses of expansionary monetary and fiscal stimulus.

When the Conservative party and Prime Minister Edward Heath took power in 1970, Britain had just gone through a period marked by a "stop-go" economic policy. That is, every time the Labour government undertook an expansionary program, employment and income increased, but this soon led to burgeoning imports and higher domestic prices. These in turn caused a serious deterioration in the balance of payments. The Labour government of Harold Wilson did its best to stem this tide, but its efforts simply postponed the day of reckoning. Eventually, growth had to be sacrificed to save the pound. (Hence the term "stop-go.") Despite these attempts at expansion, the economy grew by only 2 percent during the period in which the Labour party was in office. When the Conservatives replaced it, they assumed control of an economy in which the external account had once again exerted a severe limiting effect on domestic expansion. The pound was weak; and most seriously, the economy was operating well below its potential, with unemployment in excess of 600,000.

Given this situation, the Heath government set out to expand the economy by means of stimulative monetary and fiscal measures. On the monetary side, the stimulus was so strong that the broadest gauge of the money supply, M3 (which includes savings and demand deposits, coins, and currency), increased at rates in excess of 40 percent. On the fiscal side, the Treasury, under Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber, used such tools as tax reduction, increased government spending, and budget deficits.

These policies combined to produce an increase

¹ Peter Wiles, "Cost Inflation and the State of Economic Theory," *Economic Journal*, vol. 83, June, 1973, p. 377.

in consumer spending that initiated an economic revival. From the second half of 1971 to the first half of 1973, the economy grew at an annual rate of 5 percent.² Equally impressive was the fact that by December, 1973, unemployment was reduced to 2.1 percent of the labor force.

These measures were hardly innovative. However, there was another aspect to the Heath program. This was the way the government treated the balance-of-payments problem. The break with earlier years was Britain's entry into the Common Market (European Economic Community, or EEC). It was hoped that, as domestic income increased, the EEC would provide some of the financing and resources needed to cover the inevitable deficit in the balance of payments.

And there was one more significant structural change. To eliminate slowdowns necessitated by balance-of-payments deficits, the government cut the pound loose and allowed it to float. Theoretically, this should have enabled British goods to remain (or become) competitive as the pound depreciated. Conversely, imports would become more expensive. In this way it was thought that domestic expansion could continue, even in the face of balance-of-payments problems.

TROUBLE ALONG THE WAY

There was one hitch in all of this. Early in 1972, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) demanded a wage increase of approximately 10 percent. The government, trying to hold the line on prices (which had been increasing at a "moderate" rate of 5 percent a year), proposed a 7-percent increase. The miners rejected this offer and went on a strike that lasted seven weeks. As a result of that strike, unemployment grew to 2 million, power shortages developed, and the economy was severely disrupted.³

Finally, the government gave in and the miners won a settlement of inflationary proportions (20 percent). When this increase began to spread, Prime Minister Heath chose not to contract the economy in order to stop the rise in prices. Instead, he instituted a price-wage freeze. Thus, in November, 1972, Great Britain was treated to the spectacle of a conservative government resorting to policies usually associated with more liberal or left-of-center politicians.

Like its American counterpart, Heath's income policy had several phases. In April, 1973, the freeze ended and Phase II was initiated. In this stage,

wage increases were limited to 5 percent. In November, 1973, Phase III was instituted, and wage settlements were increased to a somewhat more liberal 7 percent.

Compliance with this incomes policy was vital. For despite the attempt to finesse the usual problems presented by the balance of payments, in 1973 Britain once again found the success of her development program resting on the performance of her external account. Despite the floating pound and entry into the EEC, the current account deficit worsened. The problem was not so much the very successful expansion of the domestic economy. Rather, it was the fact that, even before 1973's energy crisis, there had been a veritable explosion in international commodity prices. For the British, so dependent upon imports (approximately one-half of the food consumed in Great Britain is imported), this was critical.

This doubling of commodity prices (since 1971) had two major implications.⁴ First, as the price of imports rose relative to the price of exports, Britain's terms of trade deteriorated. This meant that more goods and services had to be exported to obtain a given quantity of imports. (The terms of trade fell by about 20 percent between the second quarter of 1970 and the summer of 1973.)

Second, because imports play such an important part in domestic production and consumption, higher prices were inevitable for the goods that entered the domestic standard of living. With wage increases limited under the incomes policy, a serious decline in the standard of living would result. Yet if wages were allowed to increase to offset price hikes, the balance of payments would suffer even more. This explains, in large measure, why it was so urgent that inflation not accelerate. If it did, British exports would be priced out of world markets and domestic expansion would end.

THE SUMMER OF 1973

By the second quarter of 1973, it was quite clear that the economy was approaching its full employment ceiling. A continuation of growth rates in excess of the rate at which the economy's potential was expanding could only result in more inflation. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Heath's program had been successful. Unemployment was headed for a six-year low, and Britain's growth rate was one of the highest in the EEC. And despite the fact that the consumer price index was rising at an annual rate of almost 8 percent (from the second quarter of 1972 to the second quarter of 1973), nearly 40 percent of that increase was due to higher import prices.⁵ This, of course, was beyond the government's control.

The Heath government subsequently moved into another stage in its overall economic plan. A slow-

² *National Institute Economic Review*, no. 66, November, 1973.

³ *The New York Times*, December 14, 1973.

⁴ *The Economist* (London), November 17-23, 1973.

⁵ *National Institute Economic Review*, no. 65, August, 1973.

down in order. Therefore, it was decided that the target rate of growth for 1974 would be lowered to a more modest 3.4 percent. This was more in line with the economy's potential growth rate, and it was to be achieved by reducing the rate at which government expenditures were growing. As this occurred, imports would slow, but exports would pick up and sustain the level of employment.

In its August, 1973, *Review*, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research pointed out the crucial element in this plan.

In our view, the autumn and winter 1973-74 would be the worst possible time for any relaxation of the degree of control either on the prices or incomes side. To relax controls at a time when prices are still nearly 10 percent higher than a year earlier would be a sure prescription for moving towards Latin American rates of inflation.⁶

So the Heath government headed into the fall of 1973 with a fairly successful economic performance to its credit. National income was rising; unemployment was falling; and even though prices were rising, a significant portion of those increases was due to external events. The policy now required was a reduction, but not an absolute decline, in the economy's growth rate. An incomes policy was in effect, and it was hoped that domestic inflation would moderate. This was particularly important because the continued expansion of the home economy depended on the growth of exports.

In general, the forecast for the rest of 1973 and 1974 was favorable. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's prediction was that:

by mid-1974 the economy would be working at close to full capacity, unemployment would still be falling and the current external account would be sizeable, though still manageable.⁷

This prediction was predicated on two assumptions:

- (1) that the government would be able to reduce the growth rate without causing a recession, and
- (2) that it would also be able to prevent higher import prices from spilling over into the domestic economy in the form of higher wages.

LABOR AND ENERGY: THE EDGE OF A PRECIPICE⁸

Shakespeare wrote of a winter of discontent. For the British economy, that season's first icy blasts were felt late in the fall of 1973. Suddenly the economy was on the edge of a precipice. And once again the problems were both foreign and domestic in origin. With respect to the foreign causes, as a result of the October, 1973, war in the Middle

East, Arab oil producers instituted an embargo. This should not have caused any great difficulty for Great Britain, for the Arabs regarded Britain as a "friendly" nation, one of the countries that had not come down on Israel's side in the war. But the fact was that Britain could not escape the effects of Arab production cutbacks. Even "friendly" nations would suffer, because the international oil companies would reallocate existing supplies so that no one nation would bear the brunt of OAPEC's (the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) embargo.

Arab assurances to the contrary, the Heath government did take several steps to deal with prospective oil shortages. It built up its inventories, and it reactivated its oil advisory committee, a body that had been dormant since the Suez crisis of 1956. Late in November, 1973, petroleum ration books were distributed (although rationing itself was not invoked at that time), and the government ordered oil companies to reduce their deliveries to private users by 10 percent. There was some panic buying by motorists, but as Secretary of Trade and Industry Peter Walker told Parliament, the effects of the Arab oil embargo were "so far slight."

November's second chilling development was labor unrest, domestic in origin. While serious in and of itself, when this problem was combined with the oil embargo, it marked the onset of the gravest economic crisis to afflict Britain since the end of World War II. The crisis began when the Electrical Power Engineers' Association demanded a wage increase. The engineers did not go on strike to win their demands. Instead, they resorted to a practice known as "work-to-rule." (The technique, widely used in Europe, has yet to be adopted to any great extent in the United States.) It involves working by numbers. A union does not strike. Rather, work continues—but on a different basis than usual. For example, unions refuse to work on weekends or at night. Overtime is out. A slowdown is another aspect of work-to-rule. Workers take every minute allotted them for lunch. They will not start work one minute early, nor will they stay one minute after closing time. Equipment that does not meet safety standards is rejected. If a windshield is dirty, a driver will not move a vehicle; if a train does not have a speedometer, it will not be used. Extensive checks, prescribed but rarely followed in the normal course of work, are carried out. By adopting "work-to-rule," unions can reduce output and achieve most of the effects of a strike *without* suffering the total loss of pay usually associated with a walkout.

The maneuver started with the power engineers. But more ominously, by the second week of November, the National Union of Mineworkers instituted its

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *OECD Economic Outlook*, no. 13, July, 1973.

⁸ This heading was suggested by remarks made by the president of the Confederation of British Industry, Sir Michael Clapham, when the crisis broke.

own ban on overtime and weekend work. The miners, reacting to higher prices and narrowing differentials, rejected a wage settlement of 16 percent and demanded increases that went far beyond the guidelines of Phase III.

The Arab oil embargo alone would have caused difficulties. It could, however, have been met by reallocating existing stocks, reducing petroleum consumption, and obtaining oil from alternative sources. But when 70 percent of a country's electricity is generated by coal-burning plants, a slowdown in mines turns a problem into a crisis very rapidly.

The situation worsened. If the government gave in to the miners (again), inflationary wage demands would spread throughout the economy. At the same time, if it stood firm, the country would face additional power shortages. This should have been enough to try any policy maker, but there was even more bad news.

On November 13, the balance-of-trade statistics for October were announced. During that month, Britain ran a visible trade deficit of \$825 million. (The trade deficit for the third quarter of 1973 was the largest in the country's history.) When this figure was released, a state of emergency was declared. To cool the economy further, the minimum lending rate was increased from 11.5 to 13 percent; reserve requirements for special deposits were raised; and several measures were enacted to reduce domestic energy consumption.

But there still was no breakthrough on the labor front. By the first week of December, the miners' ban on overtime began to pinch; coal output fell by 40 percent. The railroad engineers then entered into the spirit of things with their own observance of work-to-rule. This had effects far beyond the dislocations that usually accompany a disruption in transportation services. The major British rail user, is the Central Electricity Generating Board, and railroads transport 75 percent of the coal that the Board uses to produce electricity. Thus, energy supplies were squeezed from another direction, as the railroad engineers joined the miners and the Arabs. And to add to the problem, as rail services declined, more people were forced to the roads, despite the scarcity of fuel.

On December 13, the crisis came to a head. On that day, Prime Minister Heath invoked the sternest measures an elected leader has ever adopted to stop an inflation. Speaking first to Parliament and then to the nation on nationwide television, Heath told the British people that they would face "a harder Christmas" than any since World War II. He announced that some restrictions would be imposed before the

end of the year, but he also revealed that, beginning on December 31, he was putting the bulk of British industry on a three-day week. This was a draconian solution, for it meant that there would be an intentional reduction of 40 percent in the country's industrial output. And in view of the fact that some 13 million of the country's workers were not covered by minimum weekly wage agreements, it also meant that there would be substantial unemployment and reduced wages.

For Heath, the question was the government's anti-inflation program or the miners' raises. He asserted that he had made the miners a very reasonable offer and that their demands were excessive. He told the country that to bow to the miners' demands would be "to abandon our programme against inflation. . . ." It would be difficult, he said, but "the government is determined to ensure the survival of this nation at as reasonable a level of life and industrial production as it may for the months ahead."⁹

So the lines were drawn. The Prime Minister blamed the unions in general and the miners in particular; and he maintained that the nation's future depended on his determination to stick with his incomes policy.

For their part, the unions blamed the government or the Arabs for the impasse, or they charged that Heath's solution amounted to a case of economic "overkill." The Trades Union Congress (TUC), for example, argued that the government was overreacting, because it was unlikely that other unions would ask for anything like the increases the miners were demanding. Lionel Murray, general secretary of the TUC, said that giving in to the unions would be "infinitely less damaging to the national economy than the measures which have now been taken."¹⁰

FISCAL AND MONETARY RESTRAINT

Another step in the government's policy of restraint was unveiled on December 17. In an address to Parliament, Chancellor of the Exchequer Barber announced the largest cut ever made in the British national budget. Plans had been made to reduce the rate of increase of public expenditures in order to slow the economy's growth rate. That would have required a moderate cut in government spending; Barber now revealed that expenditures would be cut by \$2.76 billion, or by 4 percent in the fiscal year that begins in April, 1974. (To put this in perspective, a comparable cut in the United States budget would be close to \$12 billion.) He also said that a tighter monetary policy would be followed, that credit restrictions would be imposed, installment purchases would be more expensive, and credit-card terms would be raised.

It had been expected that there would also be a tax hike to reduce consumer demand. When Barber

⁹ *The Times* (London), December 14, 1973.

¹⁰ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, vol. 109, no. 24, December 15, 1973.

outlined his fiscal package, however, there was only a nominal change on this side of the budget. The sole increase that was made was the addition of a surcharge on the surtax on higher incomes. (This tax, as well as a change in the tax treatment of income earned in real estate transactions, would have nugatory economic effects. Its true purpose was to silence government critics on the left.)

There were several reasons why higher taxes were not enacted. One was obviously political: the government did not dare to raise taxes in the face of the other measures it had adopted. (*The Times* of London said that this was "an election budget that pretended to be willing to strike but [was] afraid to wound."¹¹)

A second and less political reason was that higher taxes would show up in an increase in the cost of living. However, Heath's Phase III included a "threshold" agreement. This stipulated that, when the cost of living rose 7 percent above the level that obtained in October, 1973, further increases would have to be met by higher wages. This would simply mean that the cost of living would then get a further boost.

Thus, in the first quarter of 1974, the British economy found itself operating on a three-day week; unemployment was skyrocketing; and incomes were falling. Some held that the cause was the energy crisis. Others saw it as the ultimate confrontation between the unions and the government. This latter view gained considerable support when the miners voted formally to strike and the Prime Minister called a special election. Now Heath's economic program and the Conservative's political survival were both at stake.

But even more was at issue. The rise of more radical elements in the unions, particularly in the NUM, meant that part of the dispute turned on the question of "who would rule Britain." In setting out to break Phase III and the Industrial Relations Act, some union members had more than wages in mind. (And this had implications for more than the Conservatives; the Labour party and the TUC were also threatened by the radicals.) Indeed, some saw the situation as an outbreak of class warfare.

Given these problems, the near-term outlook is grim. There is hope that the new Secretary of State for Employment, William Whitelaw, will be as successful in labor relations as he was in Northern Ireland. However, there is the danger that compromises with the unions in 1974 will be more than the economy can afford. With prices already rising by better than

10 percent a year, it will be extremely difficult to prevent another round of inflationary wage demands from spreading throughout the entire economy.

As for the balance of payments, it was hoped that flexible exchange rates would eliminate the necessity of slowing the economy in order to defend the pound. It has not worked out that way. There was also a possibility that recessions in many of the world's economies would force the price of commodities to fall. As a matter of fact, by the last quarter of 1973, some had. However, any favorable effects that this might have had have already disappeared. The doubling of oil prices by Persian Gulf producers will add approximately \$2 billion to Britain's import bill. This is more than sufficient to eat up any hoped-for increase in export earnings.

POSITIVE NOTES

But there are some positive notes, both tangible and intangible. With respect to the tangible, there is the prospect of oil production in the North Sea, the Celtic Sea, and the Channel. It is possible that some offshore sites will be in operation by 1976, although this is still quite chancy. Depending on the development of the requisite technology, by 1980 Great Britain might be a net exporter of petroleum.

Regarding the intangible, there is the spirit and character of the British people. If they continue to support the government in its clash with the unions, Edward Heath's gamble may succeed. This is also chancy. When the three-day work week started, newspapers wrote of London during World War II. For many, these reports called to mind recollections of Britain during the Blitz. But things have changed. Nostalgia is a poor substitute for realism. Great Britain in 1974 is a far cry from Great Britain in World War II. After the collapse of France, Britain was Europe's last hope. Today she is likened to Italy, perhaps the weakest member of the EEC.¹² As the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* observed: "You cannot command a Dunkirk spirit in a casino society."¹³

Britain's basic problem is not the energy shortage; it is inflation. The task facing Heath is to stop that inflation. Nothing less than the survival of the nation's economy is at stake. Anthony Barber expressed it best in his speech in the House of Commons on December 17. He said:

(Continued on page 133)

Rodney Morrison is an associate professor of economics at Wellesley College. His articles have appeared in the *American Economic Review*, *National Tax Journal*, *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, and other journals. He is the author of *Expectations and Inflation: Nixon, Politics, and Economics* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973).

¹¹ *The Times* (London), December 18, 1973.

¹² Walter Grunthardt, "Britain: Waiting for an Economic Miracle," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, vol. 23, no. 9, December, 1973.

¹³ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, vol. 109, no. 24, December 15, 1973.

“... Despite the hazards faced by Commonwealth Heads of Government at their Singapore conference in January, 1971, and the near breakdown of the association over such issues as Rhodesia, arms for South Africa, and the economic effects on the newer countries of Britain's impending entry into Europe—despite all this, the Commonwealth survives. It has, indeed, been strengthened in purpose in the aftermath of the de-liberations of its 33 governments at Ottawa in August, 1973.”

Britain and the Commonwealth

BY JOHN CHADWICK

Director, the Commonwealth Foundation

READERS OF THIS JOURNAL may be familiar with that astringent phrase of Dean Acheson's, back in 1962: “Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role.” Fewer perhaps will have had the pleasure of reading the successor volume to James Morris's *Pax Britannica, Heaven's Command: An Imperial Progress*. In that urbane, Augustan, and witty survey of the secondary Victorian empire, Mr. Morris (in turn borrowing from Bagehot) had this to say—and I make no apology for taking it as my basic text:

The British Empire (as goes for royal marriages) is a brilliant edition of a more general fact. It illustrates a streak in the English instinct—a taste for things foreign and incongruous. . . . Victoria's Empire offered a release for such emotions, laced with the hope of profit, the pleasure of authority and the chance of doing good. But . . . the theme grows heavier as it progresses, an instinct matures into a duty, a duty curdles into a craze, a craze becomes a burden, and the unexpected dénouement to a story of astonishing success is a feeling of relief and emancipation.¹

“Instinct-duty-craze-burden-relief-emancipation-very.” One can almost hear Mr. Jingle astonishing Mr. Pickwick in the tea tent, during one of those equally astonishing Commonwealth games of cricket, with his rattling analysis of the rise and fall of the empire. Rise? Undoubtedly, if one accepts that what was rising from the 1830's onwards already had a solid base in history. But fall? In new Commonwealth terms this is far more debatable.

By the 1890's, there was admittedly a great deal of still invisible writing on the wall. Having mastered the mechanical arts, Great Britain, small though she was, seemed equally set for world mastery. Vast areas of the map were painted in British colors. The Brit-

ish were acknowledged champions of gunboat diplomacy. The lessons of the American Revolution had been largely learned. Colonial settlements were thriving: strategic island pinpoints on the Indian route had been annexed and the scramble for Africa was going well. Yet, in the background, the Irish were as restless as ever; the United States and Germany were flexing their economic, naval, and industrial muscles; the Boers, the Ashanti, the Afghans, and the Mahdi posed their own threats to the often ill-led British redcoats. Surely, there were avenging angels in the wings at the old Queen's diamond jubilee-durbar, despite its glory and its worldwide glitter.

It would not be fanciful to claim that the secondary British empire was born in the aftermath of the Durham Report on Canada and of its cautious acceptance later in the 1840's by the British government, or that it died with the passage of the South Africa, Australia and New Zealand Acts in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Yet between 1910 and 1931—what I would call the brief “Third Empire”—there was to be a grey constitutional hiatus. While the old dominions boasted full internal autonomy, their foreign policies, defense and treaty-making powers remained, subject to some few exceptions, within the ultimate control of Parliament at Westminster. Thus, Britain in 1914 declared war on the Central Powers, not only in her own name, but in that of the dominions, colonies, and protectorates beyond the seas. There was no question of asking even the autonomous governments of Canada, Australia, South Africa, or New Zealand for consent. The Royal Proclamation, posted at St. James's Palace on August 4, 1914, coolly assumed, in the name of King George V, that Britain and the empire were at war on the sole advice of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom.

¹ James Morris, *Heaven's Command—An Imperial Progress* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).

Yet by 1916, with an Imperial General Staff in existence since 1909, those four dominions, plus Newfoundland, were present by invitation at meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet; the star among them was South Africa's General Jan Smuts. He was persuaded by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, in the year following, to remain on in London as a permanent member of the British War Cabinet itself. Hostilities ended, in the course of which dominion and colonial forces, fighting sometimes reluctantly under British command on many fronts, suffered close to a quarter of a million casualties. The Versailles Peace Conference saw the dominion Prime Ministers sitting and arguing alongside United States President Woodrow Wilson, Prime Minister Lloyd George and French statesman Georges Clemenceau. Eventually, they were to sign the peace treaties in their several rights.

De facto recognition of their independent status now achieved, the dominion Prime Ministers (again not forgetting their soon-to-be bankrupt colleague from Newfoundland) moved on through succeeding Imperial Conferences in London to that most hallowed empire day of 1926 when the Balfour Declaration saw the light of day.

This, in a memorable phrase, described the self-governing dominions as "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

Five years later these sentiments were to be legally enshrined in the Statute of Westminster. That Act declared that laws passed by the British Parliament would no longer extend to any of the dominions save at the latter's request and that their Parliaments were henceforth empowered to make laws having extra-territorial effect.

Meanwhile, the shift in relationships between Britain and her partners in white settlement had been functionally reflected in the separation from the Colonial Office in 1925 of its dominions branch. The branch acquired full departmental status under a minister of Cabinet rank. The creation of the Dominions Office led, somewhat sluggishly, to the establishment of full diplomatic relations among Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. By the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, even India (which had been represented by proxy in the Imperial War Cabinet of 1916) had her own quasi-diplomatic representative in London. So, indeed, did other lesser colonial fry. Still, for an outsider, the overall constitutional situation remained obscure. Whitehall boasted not only dominion and colonial offices, but Indian and Burmese offices to boot. The Foreign Office continued to handle rela-

tionships with a number of ill-defined protectorates and protected states.

WORLD WAR II

How different the beginning of World War II was from the start of the 1914 war. In the earlier case, King George V had unhesitatingly drawn his sword in the name of his loyal subjects throughout the empire. In September, 1939, his son, George VI, could still automatically do so on behalf of his colonial peoples. But the reaction of the four white dominions depended on their own Parliaments. The dates of their several proclamations of a state of war reflected the subtle change: Britain, Australia and New Zealand, September 3; South Africa, September 6, and Canada, September 10. In the case of South Africa, the majority in favor of declaring war was slim indeed. As to Eire (the Irish Free State/Irish Republic/Ireland) the answer, despite the previously negotiated settlement on the cession of the Irish ports, was a simple "plague on both your houses": in short, a declaration of neutrality.

And so, against this background, in the aftermath of further empire sacrifice and bloodshed, in an atmosphere designed to rid the world forever of colonialism, the fourth empire—or as many had long aspired to call it, the first true Commonwealth—was born.

By the close of the second holocaust in 1945, Britain was both rich and poor. She was rich, morally, as an acknowledged bulwark of democracy, as host to the first Assembly of the United Nations in London, and as the springboard from which lasting peace might come. She was poor in material terms. Her industries, transport systems, and overseas investments had been pillaged; her balance of payments was in disarray; her empire was in a state of ferment. In the euphoria of victory, the British felt strong, relaxed, and confident enough to carry on "regardless." But again, as at the old Queen's Jubilee some 50 years earlier, the handwriting was once more on the wall. This time it became clear all too rapidly and all too starkly. Two decades, indeed, were to prove enough to bring about what historians may regard as the most traumatic changes yet in Britain's history.

In an imperial nutshell, the close of World War II saw France reconsolidating her hold over an empire embracing large tracts of North, West, and Equatorial Africa, Indochina, and scattered possessions in the Antilles, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Portugal was clinging (and still clings) to her Central African territories. Spain, Belgium, the United States, Australia and New Zealand were still, to lesser degrees, imperial or trustee powers. But with all deference to the French cock still crowing in the desert sands and jungles, it was the British who had the largest act of decolonization to perform.

INDEPENDENCE FOR INDIA

Even in Macaulay's day, many British liberals looked on the occupation of the Indian subcontinent as both a challenge and a trust. By 1945, in the aftermath of many royal and constitutional commissions, the question was "how long." While British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had so recently growled that he had not become His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State in order to preside over the break-up of the British empire, the postwar Labour government was prompt to recognize the march of history.

The imperial mood had changed. Britain, with the older dominions (South Africa excepted) behind her, was heading for colonial evolution. With calculated and almost disastrous haste, Britain proclaimed the independence of India in August, 1947.

There is no need at this remove to trace the subsequent communal horrors; the emergence of the politically unviable state of West and East Pakistan; the ceding of independence to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) which followed only logically on the liberation of the whole subcontinent. But in retrospect three facts stand out. First, the British had developed an instinct—which was to stand them in good stead during the two decades to come—of "standing not on the order of their going." Second, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon in turn freely chose, on attaining independence, to remain within the Commonwealth. Third, the free Commonwealth was changed beyond belief in size and in strength, and in racial, customary, and religious content. By a few strokes of the pen close to 500 million people of brown skins were joined overnight to what had hitherto been looked on (with deference to the Maoris, Esquimaux, Red Indians, and Hottentots) as a white man's club. The old empire, to the nostalgic regret of some and the more harmful indignation of others, would never be the same again.

More significant to the constitutional historian and to the survival of the modern Commonwealth itself was a decision reached by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers (one did not in those days talk of "Heads of Government") at one of their periodic meetings in London, in 1949. The government of India had just given notice of its intention to declare a republic—a pronouncement which sent a shudder down the spines of those who could still remember Disraeli's gift to his Queen of the title "Empress of India." The lawyers were tied in knots at the concept of an already "divisible monarchy" being still further shattered. For many, recognition of the British monarch was the ultimate password to Commonwealth membership. Surely a republican country could have no place in the family circle—however much the diameter might otherwise expand.

Yet the incipient crisis was resolved with the same pragmatic skill of attitude and draftsmanship as had lain behind the Balfour Declaration of 1926. In April, 1949, the then eight Commonwealth Prime Ministers were able to announce that they had agreed to accept India's continuing membership on the basis of her "acceptance of the King (George VI) as the symbol of the free association of the independent Member Nations, and as such the Head of the Commonwealth." That lifesaving formula might well have been sourly savored by the ghost of Joachim von Ribbentrop who, while German Ambassador to the Court of St. James, had once rashly advised his Führer that the British empire was "held together by moonbeams." But however symbolic the "Headship of the Commonwealth" might seem, it has survived the test. There are today far more republics than monarchies within the Commonwealth. Two countries—South Africa and Pakistan—have withdrawn from the Association. But some 20 others have elected, on attaining independence, to take their place.

IRISH INDEPENDENCE

It is one of the minor, fascinating speculations of history whether or not Eire too might have remained formally within the Commonwealth had the formula of 1949 been devised a few months earlier. As it was, the Eire elections of 1948 brought a new Taoiseach, J. A. Costello, to power. He lost little time in bringing before the Dublin Dail the "Republic of Ireland" bill. It would, he told the House "end forever this country's long and tragic association with the institution of the British Crown and will make it manifest beyond equivocation or subtlety that the national and international status of this country is that of an independent republic."

While for Costello this step, taken apparently without prior consultation with the Commonwealth, brought to an end all constitutional ambiguity—"the pirouetting on the point of a pin was over," as he picturesquely put it—considerable administrative untidiness remained. The new republic was still too tightly bound to the old enemy for normal international relationships with respect to migration, citizenship, trade and employment. Yet, Southern Ireland, despite the then sleeping bogy of partition, retained the sympathy of most Commonwealth partners. The makeshift but practical arrangements devised in the aftermath of the declaration of the Republic thus led some Southern Irishmen to conclude, in Commonwealth parlance, that it was a question of "Exclude me in or include me out." Later one percipient scholar of Commonwealth and Irish affairs was to comment:

Two things are certain. One is that a distinctive voice, that of a European nationalism, was lost—and it may be

that the Commonwealth . . . was the poorer for it. The other is that twenty years later Ireland, constitutionally, would have been in a comfortable majority, republics rather than monarchies having become the norm within the Commonwealth. It remains one of the ironies of history that Ireland seceded in the year that India as a republic became a member.²

However that may be, the Irish were at one stroke cut off from the manifold areas of intra-Commonwealth consultation. They had no share in Heads of Government and other ministerial meetings. Nor did they have a seat and voice at the innumerable committees of experts and other bodies which ceaselessly, though with scant publicity, enriched the knowledge, cooperation and understanding of leaders representing close to one-fourth of the world's population. If the Commonwealth is the poorer for the absence of an Irish presence, then the loss to Ireland herself is keener still.

THE SWAMP OF DISENGAGEMENT

For the British the liberation of the Indian subcontinent was only one stride, although the mightiest, across the uncertain swamp of disengagement. Like a boa constrictor, both government and people required a period for digestion and reflection. In terms of history, it could only be brief. For France, intent on erasing the specter of defeat, was already attracting world criticism in Indochina and was soon to do likewise in North Africa. In New York, the Committee of Twenty-Four was building up its own emotional anticolonial pressures. And throughout Africa "Freedom" was soon to become the password.

It is easy to be wise in hindsight. But suppose that for one moment (forgetting the travails of other colonial powers) we place ourselves in the shoes of a British government of the 1950's. The emancipation of India and Pakistan had brought in its wake the dangerous, seemingly insoluble problems of Jammu and Kashmir. These in turn opened up new concepts of Russian and Chinese spheres of influence within the Commonwealth. The older Commonwealth members faced the hitherto inconceivable reality of "non-aligned" partners. Moreover, while British control and administration of her Indian empire had dated back almost 250 years, the colonial power had been implanted in Africa barely a century past.

In that continent, painful efforts were still being made to instill a sense of regional, as opposed to a purely national, political and administrative cohesion. With the best of intentions, federations—in West, East or Central Africa, and indeed in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific—had become the goal. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was emerging

as the arch-apostle of Pan-Africa. Compared to countries of potential wealth, population and ancient cultures—India, Ceylon or Pakistan—the fragmented areas of British Africa, with their often artificial boundaries or of the Caribbean, seemed to London eyes eminently suited for some federal solution. "*L'union fait la force.*" How else could the individual colonies measure up to the then accepted criteria for eventual Commonwealth membership—a population of a certain size; financial viability; political stability and the ability to defend frontiers without recourse to alien troops?

In the most populous tropical African country, Nigeria, efforts were already being made to weld a nexus of highly politicized peoples into a united though restricted, federal state. But as recently as 1955, few British observers seriously thought that independence would touch colonial Africa much before the 1970's. The Gold Coast? Perhaps. But for the rest, a genuine sense of dedication to myriad administrative tasks still incomplete persuaded governors, administrators and the Colonial Office alike that independence in the 1960's was merely a Fabian fantasy. Ironically, it was in the year following the Suez crisis (which itself came closer than any other event to splitting the modern Commonwealth apart) that Kwame Nkrumah, with the full assent of all existing members, brought Ghana (with twice the population of New Zealand) into the Commonwealth as a fully independent state.

The rest of the African story needs no retelling. Whereas in 1956 there was not a single independent Commonwealth country between the southern Sahara and South Africa, today there are no fewer than 13 (including Mauritius). The federal dream has faded, doubtless forever. Rhodesia has become a colony in revolt. Her own deliberate policy of apartheid has placed South Africa, now also a republic, beyond the pale of a newfound Commonwealth whose conjoint Declaration, issued at the Singapore Conference of 1971, recognized "racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness threatening the healthy development of the human race and racial discrimination as an unmitigated evil of society."

Outside Africa, change proved to be as heady and as quick. In Southeast Asia, South America, and the Caribbean, attempts at federation led to the separate independence of Malaysia and Singapore, Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, and Guyana. South Pacific countries as small as Fiji, New Zealand-administered Western Samoa, and the kingdom of Tonga were admitted to Commonwealth membership, while the mini-state of Nauru gained a new and special status. Nineteen seventy-four will see the independence of Grenada, with a population of barely 80,000 and, conceivably, independence for the auton-

² N. Mansergh, *The Commonwealth Experience* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), pp. 326-7.

omous Australian colony-cum-trust territory of Papua/New Guinea. Meanwhile Britain herself has at long last been admitted to membership in another club—the EEC.

"Britain and the Commonwealth?" To paraphrase a more famous question, one could well ask: "What is the Commonwealth to her or she to it?" With the eyes of Prime Minister Edward Heath's government on Europe; with energy, growth and other domestic crises in full spate, what time have the British to spare for the remnants of an unholy ecumenical empire? Such points were indeed starkly put even well before a new and somber crisis overtook the industrial democracies of the West. Close on 10 years ago, in *The Times* (London), under the arresting headline "The Commonwealth—Gigantic Farce," there appeared a series of articles (then widely attributed, without positive denial from his side, to Enoch Powell). Their burden was that the Commonwealth had outgrown its usefulness to Britain, and was a hindrance to British membership in Europe. Britain's leadership of the Commonwealth was offensive to French President Charles de Gaulle. Britain's pretensions with regard to the Commonwealth were outmoded. The adapted Roman concept "*civis intra-britannicus sum*" would spell the death-knell of any reasonable immigration policy. The Commonwealth connection was an albatross around the necks of British delegations at the United Nations and elsewhere and of British policy makers generally. In a nutshell, wrote the author, times had changed, and the hallowed patterns of imperial preference and of intra-Commonwealth trade had changed with them. To complete Dean Acheson's quotation, with which the article began:

The attempt to play a separate role . . . based on a special relationship with the United States, a role based on being the head of a Commonwealth which has no political structure or unity or strength . . . this role is about to be played out.

Even three years ago, that sad conclusion to a seemingly sorry set of circumstances might well have contained the final ring of truth. Yet despite the hazards faced by Commonwealth Heads of Government at their Singapore conference in January, 1971, and the near breakdown of the association over such issues as Rhodesia, race relations, arms for South Africa, and the economic effects on the newer countries of Britain's impending entry into Europe—despite all this, the Commonwealth survives. It has indeed been strengthened in purpose in the aftermath of the fur-

ther deliberations of its 33 governments at Ottawa in August, 1973.

Why? The answers are still frankly unappreciated or, even if perceived, still not accepted by statesmen, historians and laymen alike. To begin with, the big battalions do have something in their favor. As 1974 opens, the Commonwealth association represents a combined population of some 865 million peoples, spread over one-fifth of the world's land mass. Second, the Commonwealth of the 1970's has become far more an association of peoples, represented at its apex by its own United Nations—the Commonwealth Secretariat—than a forum of like or unlike-minded governments. Third, membership in the Commonwealth is no barrier to participation by its individual states in other international or regional organizations—be they defensive, like NATO, ANZUS or SEATO; politico-economic, like ECAFE, ECA or the South Pacific Commission; or, again, non-aligned and quasi-ideological, like the Organization of African States or the Bandung Pact nations.⁴

One indisputable fact is that the overwhelming majority of Britain's former colonies have, on attaining independence, sought membership in the Commonwealth simply because they have wanted to and because they have seen advantages in membership.

If the author may borrow an earlier phrase of his, the Commonwealth is still "a very lively corpse," and Britain herself is no more now than a *corpus inter pares*. Or, as he put it in another context when describing the hidden but lasting strengths of the Commonwealth, namely, its 300-odd nongovernmental associations:

That these unique links, or indeed the Commonwealth itself have weathered the storms of growth, is at root due to two factors, language and a commonly shared administrative tradition. . . . The Commonwealth is above all else a vigorous social organism, drawing its real strength and meaning from the extent to which its peoples have "become pretty well mixed up together."³

(Continued on page 133)

Appointed in 1938 to the British Colonial Office, John Chadwick ended his Whitehall career as Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He served as a diplomat in Canada and the Irish Republic and was attached to British delegations to the United Nations and NATO. Since 1966, he has been first director of the Commonwealth Foundation, an international trust charged with strengthening professional links throughout the Commonwealth. Mr. Chadwick is the author of *Newfoundland—Island into Province* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), and *A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-64* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), among other books, as well as numerous magazine articles.

³ John Chadwick, *A Decade of the Commonwealth—1955-64* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), Chapter 6, pp. 124 and ff.

⁴ NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States security treaty), SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), ECA (Economic Commission for Africa).

“... the die is cast. Britain has entered into a new stage of her age-old relationship with Europe, although it is too early yet to tell how that relationship will develop.”

Britain and Europe: A New Relationship?

BY RICHARD H. LEACH
Department of History, Duke University

JANUARY 1, 1973, was another significant day in the long train of significant days in British history, for it brought Britain into an alignment with much of Europe that may well alter her course of state for the rest of time. The headlines that proclaimed the day that “Britain Joins Europe,” however, were not quite accurate. As former Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins took care to point out in his Stimson Lectures at Yale in 1971, “Britain always has been primarily a European . . . power.” He went on to say:

There is one school of thought that sees [Britain] as having started in Europe and being now back on [her] paternal doorstep again, but after an imperial excursion lasting for most of the past three centuries. In fact [Britain has] never been away from Europe. Even at the height of [her] world dominion a great part of [her] endeavors and interests and conflicts were bound up with Europe and not with [her] transoceanic empire. [Her] culture was strongly European, and so to a large extent were the everyday details of life. Most of [her] diplomatic effort was devoted to trying to maintain [her] interests amongst European dangers, and when these peaceful efforts failed it was European wars which engaged [her] full national effort, inflicted major national damage, and burned themselves into [her] popular consciousness. It is Blenheim, Waterloo, and the Somme which are the great remembered battles of British history, not Plassey or Omdurman or even Yorktown.¹

Jenkins goes on for a while longer to make his point,

¹ Roy Jenkins, *Afternoon on the Potomac?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 23. Jenkins was Home Secretary and then Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Labour government, 1965–1970.

² See for example Norman I. Miller, “Some Tax Implications of British Entry Into the Common Market,” *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Spring, 1972, pp. 265–85. Miller’s thesis is that “the alterations in [British] tax structure resulting from . . . entry w[ill] in themselves be sufficient to affect almost every aspect of Britain’s industrial, commercial, and social life” (p. 265).

³ Robert Boardman, “What EEC Entry May Mean for Britain’s Foreign Policy,” *International Perspectives*, March/April, 1973, p. 11.

⁴ Quoted in *Overseas Review*, October, 1973, p. 5.

but the excerpt suffices for the purpose of this article: it tells us that far from a new relationship, or even a renewed one after a lapse of time, Britain’s accession to the Treaty of Rome and her entrance into the European Communities are merely the most recent steps on a long, heavily traveled path.

Even so, these steps were bound to have repercussions, not only on British foreign policy but on many aspects of British domestic policy as well.² From now on, decisions on a wide range of problems “will increasingly be taken by Britain in conjunction with [her] Common Market partners.”³ “We have to achieve our objectives in partnership with others,” Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home said in a speech in July, 1973. “We have to persuade and reconcile where previously near monopoly power operated. There are two main requirements. We must have friends and we must be consistent.”⁴ Britain will continue to be linked with other European countries through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and will deal with others on an individual basis. And to some extent her relationship with many European countries will still be influenced by her special links with the Commonwealth and the United States. But by joining the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market), Britain has taken a decisive step which puts her in league, if not yet in union, with eight continental European countries. In short, her own future as a nation has been pledged to the possibility of creating an independent Western Europe. And as of 1974, a possibility is all it remains.

BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

As already suggested, some comments on Britain’s place in the EEC must come first in a discussion of Britain and Europe. It should be noted first of all that Britain *fought* to get into the Common Market and did so chiefly for economic reasons. She did not

make an easy or a quick decision; and the choice has not been overwhelmingly popular with all British political parties and groups or with the British people as a whole. But the argument eventually carried the day that, for her own economy's sake, it was necessary not only to receive "the beneficial effects of removing customs barriers between countries, in terms of the principle of comparative costs," but more especially that through "the greater economies of scale, the sharper competition and the higher investment levels that [could] be expected to flow from membership in the Community,"⁵ she could acquire a greater "growth potential for the British economy" than she could ever have done alone. It is of course too early to tell whether the expected advantages are in fact accruing, and there are obviously a number of short-run difficulties of adjustment to overcome. The point is, however, that from the late 1950's on, Britain increasingly came to realize that her economic salvation lay in numbers and that joining the European Communities was the only viable choice available.

The economic relationship is not the only one. So inextricably tied together are economics and politics that the one relationship necessarily involves the other. Indeed, Roy Jenkins is among many who are convinced that "the case for entry [was] political more than economic," in that it promised substantially to "enlarge [Britain's] ability to influence [her] own destiny."⁶ Thus all through the 1960's, Britain argued that European political unity should be developed simultaneously with the development of economic unity. It was largely due to French opposition to that idea that Britain was prevented for so long from joining the Community. Once in, Britain has repeatedly reaffirmed her goal of creating a united Europe. Finally, the nine member countries of the Common Market are drafting the basis for a political underpinning to add to the economic superstructure already in place, which may be ready for discussion by the time this article is printed.⁷

A central feature of any political arrangement will be a strengthened European Parliament, which first met in Strasbourg in 1958 and now serves only as the supervisory and advisory organ of the three European economic communities, often referred to in the singular or simply called the Common Market—the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). At the first meeting of the European Parliament after the British joined, the British delegation made a number

of proposals to ensure that the Parliament becomes more effective. "We shall have much to say . . . about the workings of the Parliament," Peter Kirk, leader of the British delegation declared, "for the health of this Parliament is essential to the health of the Community as a whole."⁸ Some of the British suggestions were subsequently adopted, including a version of the British parliamentary-question time, and other proposed changes are still being worked out. Even so, just how a European Parliament, representative of the people of its nine constituent countries and endowed with policy initiative, would mesh with the mother of Parliaments, to say nothing of meshing with those of eight other traditionally independent bodies, remains to be seen. The American model of 1776–1789 serves to remind English and Europeans alike, however, that obstacles can be overcome and a strong central political entity established even where proud and self-centered units of government already exist and function.

Britain's impact on the European Parliament is not the only impact she has made on European institutions. The introduction of British nationals as members of Community executive bodies and into the Community bureaucracy has been a healthy one, for they have brought along with them a fresh attachment to the rule of law and the tradition of fair play. And Britain's interest in persuading the European Economic Community to devote more of its attention and resources to fields other than agriculture is already having an effect.

In sum, then, Britain officially has pledged to work as one of nine, now in the most important economic policy areas and, in the future, even on basic political decisions. By joining forces with Europe, she has forsworn much of her ability to exercise independent control over her own affairs. It should be pointed out that this is *official* policy. The British people have been lukewarm to the idea all along; British unions long opposed the move and there has been a good deal of fresh opposition to the immediate application of the Community's Common Agricultural Policy to Britain. By the fall of 1973, *The Economist* (London) observed that the popular "support in Britain for EEC membership ha[d] declined to such an extent" that Prime Minister Edward Heath was becoming very concerned for the longevity of his party in office and even for Britain's continued involvement in the European enterprise.⁹ Although the link with Europe was intended to be permanent, a reversal of policy dictated by popular demand cannot be entirely ruled out.

The British public's affection or disaffection for the EEC may well be determined by the degree to which her Common Market partners help her deal with the "worst economic crisis of many in the postwar period," a crisis which the energy problem helped become

⁵ George Thomson, "Chances for Great Britain in Europe," *Intereconomics*, no. 9, 1973, p. 270.

⁶ Jenkins, *Afternoon on the Potomac?* p. 33.

⁷ See the article by David Broder, *The New York Times*, November 29, 1973, p. 8.

⁸ Quoted in *The Parliamentarian*, April, 1973, p. 78.

⁹ *The Economist* (London), September 29, 1973, p. 61.

ominous in the winter of 1973. "Britain is now the poor man of the Community, and [Prime Minister] Heath wants a transfer of resources from the other nations to strengthen the British economy. But . . . the other members of the Community are also worried about the worsening industrial climate and unemployment. For them the question is whether they can afford to help Britain or whether they will prefer to go their separate ways and more or less bring to an end the experiment in European unity."¹⁰

In the meantime, about one-third of Britain's total trade has come to be tied to Common Market countries, and in many other ways her policy options are being shaped by Community action:

a committee of experts representing the nine EEC members plus Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland is at work developing a common energy policy for consideration by European governments;

the farm ministers of the nine EEC countries are revising the Community's agricultural policy at Britain's urging;

the industrial policy department of the European Economic Commission (the decision-making body for the European Economic Community) is drawing up guidelines for the development of Europe's pulp and paper industry;

discussions have been held in the Commission on a single European standard for lead in petrol (gasoline) to control pollution;

the Commission has developed plans for the coordination of scientific research among the nine countries.

Whether these and other developing policies turn out to Britain's liking and whether the whole package comes together as a united Europe remains to be seen. The EEC, some wag has said, is an uneasy sea for Britain to be afloat on just now.

BRITAIN AND THE NATO COUNTRIES

Every aspect of British policy, of course, is not subject to EEC restraints. An older collective relationship with European nations—and with the United States, which serves to complicate the other relationships—is based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It will be recalled that NATO was a post-war invention to provide defense against possible hostile action by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Although fears of Soviet power have waned in Europe in recent years, the Soviet challenge persists, and NATO remains operative. The recent

squeeze on oil applied by the Arab nations once again puts the spotlight on it.¹¹

As yet, the Common Market countries have not sought to develop a joint defense policy. Thus it is worth noting that the same party and government that brought Britain into the European Communities acted to increase the British contribution to NATO "both financially and in terms of the military potential which [Britain] commit[s] to that organisation. . . ."¹² There still remains the very complicated job of articulating the European Communities and NATO, for it seems imperative that they not be allowed to become competing institutions, dividing Europe between them, but that they should be seen as harmonizing institutions, between them giving the strength to a new Europe which the old Europe always lacked. That the problem is very much a present one is shown by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's position as recently as November 27, 1973, when he declared that "meaningful defense talks among European nations should be held in the framework of the European Economic Community."¹³ Getting that done is going to be difficult and will take a long time. To a large extent, its outcome depends on the United States and on the leadership of United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Britain will probably not be able to play much of a role in bringing that articulation about.

There is considerable feeling in Britain that NATO is too frozen in its anti-Soviet position to be as useful as it might. Thus Michael Stewart, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1965–66, 1968–70, recently expressed the sentiment that "in discussions leading towards a common West European foreign policy, Britain should stress the importance of holding a conference on European security and of establishing thereafter a permanent organ of consultation between East and West" rather than continuing to pursue a separatist policy. What many Britons feel is needed is "work for a more normal and less tense relationship between the two groups," a relationship they do not believe NATO permits to develop.¹⁴ Prime Minister Heath took the lead and actively began pushing NATO toward a détente with East Europe; after the settlement of the German question in 1972, NATO began to respond to those demands by instituting talks in Helsinki on the general question of European security. The talks still continue. Perhaps as a result, the U.S.S.R. has undertaken a series of moves to improve relations with NATO members, including Britain. If a true East-West détente should by any chance emerge, the question of NATO's survival in its present form would have to be answered.

Anticipating the question, the NATO Ministers Council announced after its Copenhagen meeting in

¹⁰ Clyde H. Farnsworth in *The New York Times*, December 14, 1973, p. 16.

¹¹ See Richard F. Janssen, "The New Spotlight on NATO," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 28, 1973, p. 18.

¹² *Overseas Review*, October, 1973, p. 3.

¹³ Quoted in *The New York Times*, November 28, 1973, p. 7.

¹⁴ Michael Stewart, "Now We Are In What Are We Going To Do," *The Political Quarterly*, January–March, 1973, p. 6.

June, 1973, that it would seek to revise NATO's political, economic, and military arrangements in light of "profound changes" in the international situation. The nature and extent of those revisions still have to be revealed.

In the meantime, British defense and nuclear policy development is forced to be partially a response to the decisions of NATO's Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group; and British forces (recently in slightly increased numbers) are still committed in significant amounts to the defense of Europe under NATO command.

Defense is not the only concern of NATO, so that it touches on other aspects of British policy as well. NATO early recognized political, economic, and social forces as of importance too, and it has acted over the years in a number of ways in response to them. One example will illustrate the type of response. Through a committee to consider problems of the human environment appointed in 1971, it has organized and/or supported a wide variety of medical, scientific, and technological investigations. Many of these endeavors have involved Britain, and of course Britain stands to benefit from any advances or discoveries resulting therefrom.

BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

One further possibility of British involvement with European nations collectively cannot be dismissed without some mention.¹⁵ That is the possibility of a European Monetary Union (EMU). EMU remains only at the talking stages, but at its Paris summit conference in 1972 the leaders of the European Economic Community took the first steps in a multistage program looking toward accomplishment of that objective by 1980. The first stage will be to achieve coordination of short-term economic policies. This stage was set back considerably by the monetary crisis produced by the devaluation of the American dollar, when Britain decided not to participate in the European "joint float" against the dollar but to operate in the world currency market on an independent basis.

EMU is projected to involve a great deal including better coordination of national budgeting policies, as well as of monetary policies, improvement of the machinery controlling short-term capital movements, and the creation of a common monetary identity in the international money market. Of most interest to

Britain, and a special project of hers in EEC affairs, is the proposed development of a differential regional policy and a Regional Development Fund under EMU auspices. If that eventuates,

Britain could be to Europe what Scotland is to Britain. . . . If that possibility is real even *with* significant programs of regional aid and other kinds of intra-union transfers, then monetary union *without* such programs would be clearly out of the question for . . . the United Kingdom.¹⁶

Indeed, the major influence of Britain on the European Economic Community may well be her determination "that there should be a generous regional policy, so that [she can] have a chance to get back some of the net contribution [she] will be making to the agricultural fund."¹⁷ Her worsening economic and monetary difficulties at the beginning of 1974 only make that determination firmer.

BRITAIN AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

Despite the collective arrangements to which she is a party and which admittedly form the core of her relationships with European countries, Britain remains in separate diplomatic and trade contact with every nation in Europe. This article is not the place, however, to review these relationships one by one, especially since many of the most important contacts are subsumed in one or both of the collective arrangements with Europe to which Britain is a party. There are a few outstanding sore spots: Britain has a running dispute with Spain over trade and the status of Gibraltar; relations with Ireland are marred by the problem of Northern Ireland; there is tension between Finland and Britain over defense expenditures; and it has been difficult to find common ground on which to deal with Sweden. But none of these sores has reached the critical point. Attention is thus paid only to Britain's relations to four European countries: France, Germany, the U.S.S.R., and Portugal.

Britain and France had a long period of increasing tension, because French President Charles de Gaulle tried to keep Britain out of the Common Market. Even though relaxation set in after his death and Britain was able to join the Communities, as David Leitch put it in the *New Statesman* recently, "the British and French [continue to] hold different views on a wide range of common issues. . . ."¹⁸ Indeed,

One factor hindering the work of the [EEC] Council [of Ministers] has been the development of a sharp Anglo-French rivalry. President Pompidou once joked that he had excellent personal relations with Mr. Heath, but that they disagreed on most issues. Within the Community there have been articulated differences on energy, regional policy, agriculture, transport, the renegotiation of the Yaoundé Convention, and relations with the United States.¹⁹

Certainly one reason the nine have not pursued de-

¹⁵ For a general consideration of the issue of monetary union, see Dieter Gehrman, "Monetary Integration in the EEC," *Intereconomics*, March, 1973, pp. 65-87.

¹⁶ Jon McLin, *A Note on the European Community: 1973*, American Universities Field Staff, *Fieldstaff Reports*, West Europe Series, vol. 8, no. 3 (general), July, 1973, p. 2.

¹⁷ McLin, *A Note on the European Community: 1973*, p. 10.

¹⁸ *New Statesman* (London), May 25, 1973, p. 755.

¹⁹ *European Trends*, no. 36, August, 1973, p. 2.

fense discussions very far and have in a sense deferred to NATO in the defense area (even though France is no longer a member of NATO) is that there are problems involved in bringing French and British defense views into line. The British view continues to stress an Atlantic defense framework, while the French view is continental.

One should not make too much of the strain between Britain and France, however. There is a long tradition of friendship and alliance between them, which cannot wholly be discounted. And at least the British have sought to reemphasize old ties—Queen Elizabeth paid a state visit to France in 1973. Prime Minister Heath and French President Georges Pompidou had their first “summit” meeting in May, 1973, and both men tried to play down the long agenda of issues still to be resolved between the two countries. After the Heath-Pompidou talks, it was announced that a tunnel under the English Channel will be constructed, with a completion target date of 1980. If, in fact, the tunnel is completed, or even if the work is begun within that period, a radical change in British-French relations may logically be anticipated.²⁰

BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Britain's relationship with Germany has also been undergoing change, in large measure because of the phenomenal rise in German prosperity and industrial and commercial eminence in recent years. Because she is the rich member of the nine, the other members, including Britain, look to Germany to bear a large portion of the costs of developing EEC projects. Thus when Bonn Chancellor Willy Brandt visited Prime Minister Heath early in the fall of 1973, the discussion kept coming back to financial questions. In the words of one German newspaper, “What Mr. Heath needed was more money, first and foremost; Bonn as the ‘paymaster’ of Europe being expected to foot the bill,” especially for the Community's “regional development plan, which Britain is so anxious to see implemented.”²¹ Germany is also of current importance to Britain because Germany has made a special place for herself vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. and East Europe. “How,” asks Anthony Hartley, is this difference in status “to be prevented from developing into a yawning crevasse which could engulf the [European Economic] Community and [the] Atlantic Alliance?”²²

Moreover, Britain's desire to make a united West Europe a viable entity may depend for its attainment on the effect Britain's emphasis on democratic controls has on Germany's penchant for bureaucracy.

Finally, Germany is important to Britain as a co-worker in the development of atomic power. A new centrifuge technique to develop uranium fuel has just been developed by a German, Dutch, and British troika—URENCO—in which Germany is the recognized leader.

All that needs to be said about the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union is that they could hardly be called cordial, especially since the mutual expulsion of diplomats and others in 1971. The U.S.S.R. opposed the whole European Community concept and so opposed British entry therein. That nine countries, rather than six, are now standing together in their trade relationships with East European countries and in virtual opposition to the Soviet Union cannot be pleasing. But the implications of letting too much frost settle on their relationship have been bothering Britain, and finally in December, 1973, British Foreign Secretary Alexander Douglas-Home was able to talk with Soviet leaders in Moscow and to claim on his return to London that “relations between the two countries are now back to normal after the coolness of the past two years.”²³ The communiqués issued after the visit expressed both countries' intentions of keeping them so.

The relationship between Britain and Portugal needs comment only because in 1973 the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was 600 years old, an event celebrated by an exchange of visits between the Duke of Edinburgh (to Lisbon) and Portuguese Foreign Minister Marcello Caetano (to London). Portugal is a member of NATO along with Britain, and was formerly aligned with Britain in EFTA (European Free Trade Association). But over and beyond these ties, Britain has a special regard for Portugal, her “old and loyal ally.”²⁴ Thus, when she entered EEC, it was with the understanding that Portugal's trading interests would be protected. Even so, Britain is hard put to accept Portuguese African policies in the face of pressure to repudiate them from the African Common-

(Continued on page 133)

Richard H. Leach is a member of the Commonwealth Studies Group at Duke University. Among other books, he is the author of *Interstate Relations in Australia* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1965), *Contemporary Canada* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1968), *American Federalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970) and, with A. T. Mason, *In Quest of Freedom* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959). In 1975, he will become a Senior Scholar at Australian National University.

²⁰ See A. M. Muir Wood, *et al.*, “The Channel Tunnel,” *The Geographical Journal*, June, 1973, pp. 258–79.

²¹ *Kieler Nachrichten*, September 8, 1973, quoted in *The Bulletin*, no. 35/21, October 9, 1973 (*The Bulletin* is a publication of the Press and Information Office of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany).

²² Anthony Hartley, “The Politics of Europe: The Power Factor,” *The Round Table*, no. 249, January, 1973, p. 141.

²³ Quoted in *Durham Morning Herald* (Durham, N.C.), December 6, 1973, p. 7A.

²⁴ *Notes on Current Politics*, no. 15, July 30, 1973, p. 226. *Notes on Current Politics* is a publication of the Conservative party.

"If . . . a fair chance for jobs and housing is more important to the average Catholic in Northern Ireland than the mystical principle of the unity of Ireland, time and the new policies will produce a healing."

Britain and Ireland: Dilemmas in the British Balkans

BY ARTHUR CAMPBELL TURNER

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside

IN ANY DESCRIPTION of British political and social institutions and the way they work it is customary to speak in terms of a well-ordered society: of stability, tolerance, a tendency to compromise, agreement on fundamentals, and the avoidance of violence. All this is true up to a point. Such civic virtues, so conducive to orderly and decent community life, are in general displayed by the British. Still, it is difficult to reconcile this picture with the fact that in one part of the United Kingdom itself there have been some 900 deaths in civil strife since 1949.

The area is, of course, Northern Ireland; and the situation in Northern Ireland is merely the present-day version of a chronic political enigma, which has puzzled British statesmen in many generations, an enigma obsessive and destructive, one that has ruined many careers and caused many crises and, above all, one that has never been solved. Great Britain has had many successes and much that is honorable and admirable in her history; but the skeleton at her feast is Ireland, a reminder that even the most decent and well-meaning polities have their dark undersides, their formidable failures.

Two points about British attitudes to Ireland perhaps deserve a word of comment by way of introduction. First, while to Britain "the Irish question" is a perennial problem, the Irish have another point of view—for them the relationship creates "the British problem," the problem of maintaining some sense of national identity and objectives in the face of an overwhelmingly larger, richer and more populous

neighbor. For 800 years England has taken the initiative in providing and modifying the political structures of Ireland. Even Irish initiatives aimed at modifying English policy have had to be channelled through England. However regrettable it may be, to write a history of Anglo-Irish relations from a genuinely Irish point of view would hardly be possible.¹

Second, the English have been accustomed to speak as though Ireland were some extraordinary and unique problem which fate had foisted on them. This is a rather parochial point of view. Viewed in a broad perspective, the Irish situation falls into place as one of a rather numerous class of problem situations. The situation is difficult because it is the legacy of an *incomplete conquest*—more nearly complete in one area than in the others, but nowhere total. Such situations occur with considerable frequency and have been especially common in Central and Eastern Europe.² As Sir Lewis Namier wrote, "Most frontier problems in Europe are due to incomplete conquests in the past."

Each conquest was integral within certain districts, partial over much wider areas. In the case of partial conquests the upper classes and the urban population were as a rule the first to be replaced or assimilated by the conquerors, while the peasantries retained their original nationality. Every Ireland had its Ulster, its towns of "the Pale," its Anglo-Irish gentry, and its peasantry, which wherever it has survived, in the long run gets the better of the other classes—a returning, reconquering tide.³

TOO MUCH RELEVANCE

Past history seems more akin to current history in Ireland than in most countries. The curse of Ireland, perhaps, is that too much of her history is relevant to the present discontents, and that it is too well remembered by all parties. The actions of Oliver Cromwell, King Billy and Wolfe Tone are still part of the current coin of controversy in Ireland. There is very little in Irish history that can be dismissed as *not*

¹ It would have been somewhat easier to do so if the Irish rebels in Dublin in 1916 had not burned a vast body of Irish archival materials, when they destroyed the Four Courts.

² Questions like those of the relations of Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and the "Sudetenland," or of the Polish-Russian or Polish-German borderlands, or of Trieste, are all of this species.

³ L. B. Namier, *Conflicts: Studies in Contemporary History* (London: Essay Index Reprint Service, 1942), pp. 4–5.

relevant, since the day in 1166 when Dermot McMurrough, King of Leinster, set sail for Bristol in search of English help in his wars with Rory O'Connor. The most potent ally he found was Richard de Clare ("Strongbow"), Earl of Pembroke, who became his son-in-law and after Dermot's death seized and held Dublin and all of Leinster. He acknowledged in 1172 that he ruled them as their feudal tenant-in-chief under Henry II of England, who established the "lordship of Ireland" as one more territory in his vast Anglo-French empire. It was thus that the Anglo-Irish connection began. In the words of a modern Irish poet, Oliver St. John Gogarty, Strongbow and Henry

Brought rigid law, the long spear and the horsemen
Riding in steel [to Ireland].

The Henrician conquest of Ireland was not in any real sense an *English* conquest; it was simply an overflow of Norman energy pushing on into new territory a few generations after the Norman Conquest of England. There were parallel, although different, overflows of Norman energy into Wales and Scotland. (Robert the Bruce, the patriot-liberator King of Scotland, was by descent a Norman nobleman.) But the surplus of energy available to medieval England was never adequate for the complete conquest of Ireland, and no serious effort to that end was made. Only three medieval English kings (Henry II, John and Richard II) ever visited Ireland.⁴ The area of actual English settlement and control—"the Pale"—shrank to a mere fraction of the island.

It was only in the vigorous Tudor period that England found enough interest and energy to complete the conquest of Ireland, a process that took two long generations, in the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I. Henry VIII assumed the title of "King of Ireland" in 1541. The end of Irish resistance coincided with the death of Elizabeth in 1603. Soon, many of the native Irish aristocracy fled abroad, to provide in later generations a Marshal and President of France (MacMahon) and a Prime Minister of Austria (Taaffe).

It was the peculiar misfortune of the Irish situation,

a curse that has had its effects on every period since, that the dividing line between conquerors and conquered became one of religion. The period in which the English conquest of Ireland was completed also happened to be the period in which England adopted Protestantism and created a new, official "Church of England." Therefore, inevitably but disastrously, Protestantism became regarded as the badge of the conquerors, and loyalty to the old religion became synonymous with Irish nationality. Similarly, at the other end of Europe, Catholicism in Poland was intensified because the Poles were threatened or oppressed by the Lutheran Prussians and Swedes, and the Orthodox Russians. But after the "flight of the wild geese," the Irish were much worse off in their lack of a native aristocracy. The parish priests exercised so much power in Ireland because they provided a surrogate for a lay leadership that was no longer there.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF ULSTER

The roots of the current situation in Northern Ireland are to be found in the process known as "The Plantation of Ulster" that began in 1607. Plantation, i.e., colonization, was a familiar proceeding in Tudor and Stuart times, and was the same in principle whether it was carried out in Virginia or other parts of North America, or in Ireland. It meant the systematic "planting" of people on new soil—never as systematic in practice as in the planning—the replacement (usually partial, hardly ever complete) of the previous inhabitants by the colonists, and the division of the area into English local government units. In this way most of Ireland had been divided up into "shire ground," i.e., counties, under Elizabeth, and had received a top stratum of population from England.

Paradoxically, Ulster⁵ was the last stronghold of Gaelic culture in Ireland, but when it was subject to "plantation" in the early seventeenth century it rapidly lost most of the old culture. It became a special case—the part of Ireland that was different from the rest. The process of "plantation" was carried through somewhat more systematically in Ulster than in other parts of Ireland; it involved larger numbers of settlers—many of them small farmers from southwest Scotland who were Presbyterians, not Episcopalian members of the Church of England. In consequence, Ulster developed what other parts of Ireland scarcely possessed: a class of immigrant settlers at the tenant-farmer level. In Ulster, the base of the social pyramid, and not merely the top, ceased to be Irish.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CATHOLICS

The British civil wars of the seventeenth century culminated in the too-well-remembered Battle of the Boyne, fought on July 1, 1690,⁶ at Drogheda, north of

⁴ First-hand knowledge of Ireland has often seemed unnecessary even to those framing Irish policies. W. E. Gladstone (1809–1898), whose obsession was Ireland in the last period of his long political life, visited it only once, for a few days.

⁵ Ulster is one of the four ancient provinces of Ireland. The others are Leinster (southeast), Munster (southwest), and Connaught or Connacht (west). The Northern Ireland area carved out in 1920 comprises only six counties (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone) of Ulster's historic nine, but Northern Ireland is nevertheless commonly called "Ulster."

⁶ Known rather obscurely as "The Glorious Twelfth" to Ulster Protestants, the main action was fought on July 1 on the old, or Julian calendar, i.e., July 11 on the New or Gregorian calendar. The Gregorian calendar was not in use in England (or Ireland) until 1752, but it was in use in Scotland in the seventeenth century.

Dublin, in which the Dutch Protestant King of England, William III; defeated the English Catholic King, James II. The victory is still celebrated by Protestants in Northern Ireland. The aftermath of William's victory in the civil war and subsequent decades saw the enactment by the Irish Parliament of a complex penal code directed against Catholics and intended to hamper them in every way in entering public service or the professions, and even in holding land. These vexatious and discriminatory laws built up a capital of resentment that, after two centuries, is not yet fully dissipated. The most that can be said in palliation is that the anti-Catholic laws were never rigidly and consistently enforced, and that no one died for his religion.

Ireland had always been a violent place, compared to England. Since the penal laws closed off normal political channels to the Catholic Irish, they increased the tendency for grievances to be expressed in violent action such as cattle-maiming, arson and murder. During the two centuries of the "Protestant Ascendancy," Ireland was, of course, peaceful much of the time; but she was always much nearer the edge of violence than any other part of the British Isles, and the line was often crossed.

The eighteenth and nineteenth century situation must not be thought of as a simple line-up of Catholic versus Protestant. The Protestant governing class in Ireland, "the Protestant Nation," had its own grievances against England, connected with restrictions on Irish trade and on the powers of the Irish Parliament. Irish Protestants thought of themselves as Irish, and they soon become exponents of their own brand of Irish nationalism. Only late in the day did the Catholic Irish again become politically articulate. Daniel O'Connell (1775-1847) was the great exception. Henry Grattan and Henry Flood in the eighteenth century, Isaac Butt and Charles Parnell in the nineteenth, John Redmond in the twentieth—all these leaders of Irish nationalism were Protestants, all belonged to the "Ascendancy" classes. As long as property was equated with political power, the Ascendancy could think of itself as, and be accepted as, the Irish nation.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 1782-1922

The constitutional relationship between England and Ireland has undergone a number of changes since the eighteenth century. In the age of Grattan and Flood, the chafing of the (Protestant) Irish Parliament at the restrictions on its power produced a lifting of those limits, and from 1782 to 1800 Ireland enjoyed a curious and anomalous foretaste of "Dominion Status." But the Irish rising of 1798 and the war with France made this seem too dangerous. The result was the Union of 1800, which merged Ireland in the pre-existing Union of England and Scotland

(created in 1707), and thus brought into being "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," which lasted until 1922.

William Pitt had intended that union should be accompanied by the removal of the remaining legal barriers against Catholics, but this was not accomplished until 1829, when O'Connell succeeded in bringing about "Catholic emancipation," of which the main point was the right of Catholics to sit in Parliament.

It had been hoped that the union with Ireland would be as successful as the analogous union with Scotland, but this did not prove to be the case. In the course of the nineteenth century, as Britain inched toward democracy and the political power of the land-owning classes waned, one step after another was taken to remedy specific Irish grievances. The privileged position of the (Protestant) Church of Ireland was abolished (1869). A long series of statutes in the last quarter of the century improved the position of the Irish peasant vis-à-vis his landlord. Finally long-term loans were provided to enable the landlords to be bought out, and Ireland turned into a nation of peasant-proprietors. Still, all this really accomplished was to weaken the forces that believed in the Union. It did nothing to meet the central grievance of the Irish, that they wished the freedom to run their own affairs, that they simply did not consider themselves part of the British nation. The Liberal party put forward Home Rule bills for Ireland from the 1880's, but even the third one, which was eventually passed into law in 1914 (and was immediately suspended because of the war) proposed to confer only a limited autonomy. Perhaps this, or British Prime Minister William Gladstone's earlier bills, would have satisfied the Irish, but it seems unlikely. Irish attitudes toward Britain had also been exacerbated by the famine of the 1840's, which resulted in perhaps half a million deaths and led to a mass emigration to the United States; the population of Ireland fell in a couple of decades from some eight million to the five million at which it has remained.

One of the most extraordinary facts about the endless discussions of "Home Rule" in the generation prior to 1910 was the refusal to face the plain truth that Ulster was different from the rest of Ireland. This was a complication that neither Irish nationalists nor British Liberal politicians wanted to contemplate. But as the imminence of Home Rule actually approached, Protestant agitation in Ulster (led, but not created, by Tory leaders like Sir Edward Carson and Bonar Law) at last made it clear that there was one part of Ireland that would refuse Home Rule, if it meant being ruled by a Parliament in Dublin responsive to a Catholic majority in the whole island.

World War I and the Allied emphasis on the rights of small nations naturally led to trouble in Ireland—

in fact, to "The Troubles," a prolonged and complicated period of civil strife, ambushes, terrorism and the burning of mansions, which began with the Easter Rising of 1916 and lasted half a dozen years. The solution that Premier Lloyd George proposed and enacted, the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, at last recognized the existence of Ulster as a special case, although two-thirds of its provisions were still-born. The act is interesting because of its resemblance to the British government's proposals of 1973. The 1920 Act proposed the creation of two separate governments in Ireland, both still subordinate to the Westminster government—in other words, a federal system. Southern Ireland, with its capital in Dublin, would govern in the 26 Irish counties in which Catholics predominated; Northern Ireland, with its capital at Belfast, would comprise the six predominantly Protestant counties of the northeast. Both areas would continue to send representatives to Westminster, which would have power over defense, foreign policy and the other more important policy areas. The two parts of Ireland would be afforded an opportunity to cooperate as far as they wished through the creation of a "Council of Ireland."

The *Sinn Féin*⁷ nationalist party, by this time predominant in the 26 counties, would have nothing to do with the proposal for an Irish Parliament of limited powers, with Ireland's continued membership in the British state, or with the Council of Ireland; all this fell by the wayside. But the Ulster Protestants found acceptable the proposal for a Parliament and executive of Northern Ireland which, clearly, they would control. This part of the 1920 statute proved viable. The Northern Ireland Parliament came into being in 1921, and lasted for just over 50 years, until it was suspended in 1972.

As far as the 26 counties were concerned, the 1920 Act was replaced by the Treaty of December 6, 1921, hammered out in London between the British government and the *Sinn Féin* negotiators. The new state, to be called "the Irish Free State," was to be a Dominion, with the same status as Canada, i.e., virtual independence. It would still recognize the Crown, but it would not be part of the United Kingdom.⁸ *Sinn Féin* accepted, reluctantly, the fact that for the moment the six Protestant counties would not be part of the Irish Free State. The British breathed a sigh of relief. The Irish Question appeared to be more or less solved.

As time went on, the southern Irish under Eamon

De Valéra's leadership were successful in whittling down the British connection, and eventually reduced it to nothing. In 1937, a new constitution made the Irish Free State into "Eire"—the Irish Gaelic for "Ireland." The Crown was reduced to a mere matter of "external association"—a legal relationship hitherto unknown. Eire remained neutral in the war, with a German ambassador resident in Dublin. In 1949, Eire became "The Republic of Ireland," with no constitutional links at all with England.

NORTHERN IRELAND

In Northern Ireland, the Conservative party (called Unionist in Ulster, as it often is in Scotland) enjoyed a permanent majority of about two-thirds in the provincial House of Commons of 52 members. Politics there polarized along Protestant-Catholic lines, and the development of a local Labour party was thereby hampered. This gave politics a somewhat pathological character, although for four and one-half decades politics seemed reasonably stable.

One must tread warily in attempting to define the social and political conditions in Northern Ireland between 1922 and the late 1960's. There *was* discrimination, but it had no legal basis, being in fact explicitly forbidden by the 1920 statute. Thus Catholics were not in the position of Catholics in eighteenth century Ireland, or of blacks in the United States prior to the 1950's. Nor, of course, were they subject to the kind of thorough and organized repression that is the lot of dissidents in many Communist and other states. But Protestants were in apparently permanent and complete control of the government, and this control at the grass-roots bread-and-butter level procured for them a myriad of advantages in relation to local government matters—especially the availability of public housing, police, and employment—in fact, in all the normal contexts of everyday life. The discrimination was felt to be at its sharpest in Londonderry (or "Derry"), the second largest city, which has a population two-thirds Catholic, but whose City Council (thanks to gerrymandering) had a Protestant majority. To some extent, religion correlated with social status, although there was a Catholic middle class as well as a Protestant one. There were more rich Protestants than rich Catholics, but there were some of the latter. There were also more poor Protestants than poor Catholics, but the very poor were more likely to be Catholics, and Catholics had a higher unemployment rate.

The basic demographic statistics of the Irish situation are rather simple, and in a sense everything turns on them. In Northern Ireland, two-thirds of the population, numbering almost exactly one million, are Protestant; the other half-million are Catholic. In the Republic, which has a population a little over three million, Protestants are a small minority of

⁷ *Sinn Féin* is often translated "Ourselves Alone," but the correct translation is "Ourselves." The party, founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith, took over the nationalist leadership during the First World War from the more moderate Redmond party.

⁸ The United Kingdom soon changed its official title to "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

about seven percent. These figures are surprisingly constant. The Catholic birthrate is higher, but Catholics are more prone to emigrate.

FACILIS DESCENSUS AVERNO, 1968-1972

The horrors that descended on Northern Ireland in the late 1960's followed paradoxically on a few years when the situation seemed to be improving. The first meetings between the Prime Ministers of Northern Ireland and the Republic took place in 1965 and 1966. For the subsequent souring of developments, most commentators think that the incendiary Protestantism of the Reverend Ian Paisley must bear a large share of blame. The slide toward disaster started fairly innocuously in 1968 when, following the American example, civil rights marches were held in various areas, the marchers making a point of going through Protestant areas as well as Catholic or neutral areas. This movement was carried on, with a good deal of support in the universities, by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, formed early in 1967. It was "non-sectarian," a term defined by Conor Cruise O'Brien, probably the wisest and least biased of all commentators on recent events in Ulster, as meaning, "as usual in Northern Ireland, Catholic-based with a few Protestant sympathizers."⁹

The mutual hostility of the two religious communities escalated steadily in 1969, the year when the descent to the abyss really accelerated. The year began with the savaging of civil rights demonstrators at Burntollet on January 4. The British government sent in troops in August to act as a buffer between the warring factions. At first welcomed by the Catholics, the troops soon found hostility as they carried out arms searches. Both sides began to store, and use, arms. Perhaps most significant, in December, 1969, the IRA—the Irish Republican Army, the active, military part of Sinn Féin—split into an Official and a Provisional wing. The militant Provisionals have made the running in Northern Ireland ever since, in terms of terror and violence. Their simple purpose is to free Ireland entirely from the British and to unify it, and they are without regard or mercy for anyone or anything that gets in the way, whether it be Protestants or Catholics, or the law of Northern Ireland or the law of the Republic.

The five years from the beginning of 1969 through 1973 have seen an appalling breakdown of civilized

order in Northern Ireland. Murder by sniping or by bombing has become commonplace, and the cities are scarred and shabby. The necessary countermeasures involve imposing repeated searches at street corners and at the gates of the steel fences which surround shopping areas. Over 900 people have died in the various violent incidents of the five years.

BRITISH INITIATIVES

The British government, which bears the ultimate responsibility for the government of Northern Ireland, and which supplies the troops—they reached a high of 21,000 in 1972, the worst year, in which 470 people died—has tried with considerable energy to meet the situation, and it is now possible that their efforts will in the end pay off. Partly as a result of the events in Derry on January 30, 1972, when 13 Catholics were killed by troops, the provincial government of Northern Ireland under Premier Brian Faulkner was suspended on March 30, 1972, and British Prime Minister Edward Heath sent in as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland one of his most able colleagues, William Whitelaw.¹⁰ Whitelaw has made long and partly successful efforts to bring the warring factions together, and he has certainly made a favorable impression by his sincerity and manifest good will.

Whitelaw's hand was seen in the proposals announced in the White Paper on *Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals* published on March 20, 1973, and enacted into law a little later. These are essentially proposals for the sharing of power between the majority Protestant and minority Catholic parties. They provide for the election of a new 80-member Assembly elected by proportional representation,¹¹ and for an Executive formed by chairmen of assembly committees whose members would reflect the legislature's balance of parties. The new Assembly was duly elected on June 28, the official Unionists (supporters of Faulkner) gaining 22 seats; other Unionists, 13; the two extreme Protestant groups between them, 15; the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP—the chief moderate Catholic party), 19; the non-sectarian Alliance Party, 8. Over 72 percent of the electorate voted, and the Provisional IRA's hostility to the election was largely ineffective.

The new Assembly held a first, unfortunately rowdy, meeting on July 31, and a remarkably peaceful and successful second meeting on October 15. Difficult

(Continued on page 134)

⁹ Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland* (London: Pantheon, 1972), p. 154.

¹⁰ In December, 1973, Whitelaw, a wealthy Scotsman, was transferred to the possibly even more difficult assignment of Minister of Labour. He was succeeded in Ireland by Francis Pym.

¹¹ Voting for the Parliament of Northern Ireland under the 1920 Act was by proportional representation (which gives minorities a stronger voice), but this was abolished by the government of Northern Ireland in 1929—an action the British government had the legal power to veto, and probably should have vetoed.

Arthur Campbell Turner has taught at Glasgow, Toronto and Berkeley, and was one of the founders of the distinguished Riverside campus of the University of California, where he is professor of political science. Among his books is *The Unique Partnership: Britain and the United States* (New York: Pegasus, 1972).

"In diplomatic, strategic, and economic matters, the prospect for the immediate future is that Anglo-American considerations will be only one and often a lesser motif in a whole series of complex talks and negotiations involving the United States with all the countries of the European Community, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, as well as a considerable number of developing countries."

Britain and the United States

BY PETER LYON

Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT at all that the Anglo-American alliance is, in early 1974, in some disarray. Acute domestic difficulties afflict and preoccupy both incumbent governments, in London and in Washington. Continuing and rather complex confrontations between the principal oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, the aftermath of the latest Arab-Israeli war—all these matters bedevil and cast a blight of acute uncertainty over much of the current international landscape, over the Common Market (EEC), intra-NATO matters and over Anglo-American relations. In such trying circumstances, it is difficult and yet important to keep a sense of perspective. Is this merely a spell of temporary bad weather to be borne stoically while working for and awaiting the resumption of the generally favorable condition of Anglo-American relations? Or are we at a critical juncture in this relationship as well as in world affairs at large?

Two preliminary points need to be made at the outset. First, it is becoming less and less realistic to review contemporary Anglo-American relations in any merely binocular way that focuses exclusively on their purely bilateral relationships. Britain's membership in the Common Market since January, 1973, has added great practical emphasis to the point that relations between Britain and the United States need to be seen in the perspective of a field of forces which includes the EEC, NATO, and many other institutions and arrangements, and in which all the world is in many respects a single stage. It is also obvious that Britain's membership in the EEC does not mean the swift and entire end of her individuality.

Second, in addition to the degree of inherent artificiality in focussing on the bilateral ties between Britain and the United States, there is a tremendous overhang of history, of memories and of mutually distorting mythology, which is at once ideological camouflage and yet an important dimension of the relationship.

Over the years, the Anglo-American relationship

has been much exposed to eulogy, sometimes to abuse, and even occasionally to sustained analyses. Whether or not this is "a special relationship" is a surprisingly persistent question, especially from British shores; the answers to the question hinge, of course, on what content is ascribed to "special." Among the more notable recent attempts to encapsulate analysis and the essence of the relationship in a phrase are the following:

"the partnership" (Herbert Nicholas in 1963)

"the debatable alliance" (Coral Bell in 1964)

as part of "the troubled partnership" of the Atlantic Alliance (Henry Kissinger in 1964–1965)

"the natural relationship" (Edward Heath in December, 1971)

"the unique partnership" (Arthur Campbell Turner in 1971)

part of "the grumbling alliance" (Andrew Shonfield in 1972)

The first reaction, then, of an essayist, compelled to brevity and yet bent on depicting the current condition of the Anglo-American relationship, must be despair at the utter ambiguity and inadequacy of the standard vocabulary. How can anyone possibly subsume within a pellucid phrase all the linkages and nuances at issue? For undoubtedly, in the past two or three decades, this has become a much entangled alliance.

In some respects Britain and the United States are more mutually entangled today than ever before; but popular understanding of the nature and significance of these entanglements is at best crude and behind the times. Existing notions of strategy and security, political management and political economy, coexistence and cooperation are undergoing serious reexamination and redefinition as new balances are being sought and struck between domestic and foreign policy choices and imperatives.

Great Britain's generally close and cordial relations

with the United States are based on strong ties of both sentiment and interest. It has often been said that, despite the influx of many diverse nationalities, the United States remains fundamentally British in language, culture, legal system, and institutions. The affinities and conformation in the British and American characters, stemming from common origins and similar social and political ideals, are so pervasive that it is difficult to say how far sentiment can be separated from the other elements in Great Britain's interests in relation to the United States.

Over 30 years ago, the late Sir Harold Nicolson wrote a little book on diplomacy which soon became widely regarded as a minor classic. Drawing on his wealth of reading and a personal experience of diplomacy going back at least to the time when events precipitated him, as a junior member of the Foreign Office, into the company of Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George at Versailles in 1919, he wrote that his own experience of American negotiators had been uniformly happy. And he continued, without any apparent intention of sarcasm, to say:

They are hampered by the same disabilities as are the British diplomatists in that they are obliged to consider the feelings of their people at home. Nor do I envy any American diplomatist the jealous and almost totally ignorant scrutiny of Senatorial Committees. But their ideals are the same as British ideals, only simpler and more unhampered.

In this age of instant communication, press revelations and Watergate scandals who would say confidently that Congress (or any other body regularly and actively interested in public affairs) is the irredeemable repository of dark ignorance and prejudice while the State Department, the presidency, or any area of the government is unquestionably a source of light and of probity? One wonders whether Nicolson, were he still alive, would still want to say that American ideals are the same as British ideals "only simpler and more unhampered." One suspects that many Americans would want to reverse the maxim. Nevertheless, if one thinks of George Kennan's extensive and eloquent writings on American diplomacy, with recurrent pleas for professional and quiet diplomacy, and his preference that negotiations be secret and that only final agreements should be publicized, it does seem as if the Nicolson-Kennan-like views constitute a deep and continuous vein in Anglo-American diplomatic culture.

The amount of technical and confidential information freely passed between the British and American governments is seldom found in relations between other countries. It stems less from formalized links and deliberate planning than from habits of trust and mutual esteem that have grown up between the governments over the years, and—a few specific occasions

and issues apart—regardless of changes of personnel in the main offices of either country.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Without doubt, the most important security aspect of common Anglo-American concerns continues to be that embodied in joint membership in NATO. The continuing significance of this alliance is still an unsailable orthodoxy of British politics and is rooted in bipartisanship, whatever differences of emphasis may exist. In the future, even more than in the past 25 years, Britain's defense effort will be principally directed toward the maintenance of her forces in Europe and toward the allied effort in the Atlantic and adjacent seas.

Recent events, however (particularly the American-Soviet détente), have made it clear that familiar strategic relationships are changing under the pressure of new circumstances, and these determine issues far wider than Anglo-American relations even though they do much to shape the context within which this relationship continues.

Originally, the Atlantic alliance was created on the basis of strategic assumptions very similar to those that had underlain the rapidly extemporized Anglo-American military connection in the two world wars. West Europe twice, and, for much of the Second World War, Britain alone, served as the forward base for American operations. To keep transatlantic links open entailed retaining control over the intervening Atlantic. During World War II and for some time afterwards Nicholas Spykman's geopolitical analysis of the inadequacy of a Fortress Western Hemisphere approach to American security expressed a widely accepted view which was amplified and adapted to fit individual styles and circumstances by Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles from the one side and Winston Churchill, Aneurin Bevin, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan, successively, from the other side of the Atlantic. In less coherent form, much the same outlook had inspired Woodrow Wilson's belated concern at the course of European events, and somewhat similar notions underlay Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and the [Harry] Truman Doctrine as well as the strategic doctrines of the Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy presidencies.

Thus NATO originally embodied a traditional transatlantic response to imbalance in Europe, adapted to new circumstances. It is often forgotten that this time of formal alliance making within Europe in time of nominal peace was almost as much a diplomatic revolution for Britain as it was for the United States, and was found generally acceptable by the British public largely because Britain was seen to be entering NATO in tandem with the United States. Whatever British rhetoric may have at times suggested to the contrary, from 1949 until the Suez im-

broglie in 1956 and from the Nassau agreement of 1962 until Britain was firmly promised entry into the Common Market for January, 1973, she consistently regarded the American connection as more important than any other. Undoubtedly, the United States predominated in the alliance, for the other elements in the alliance were undeniably inferior to the potential aggressor. But Britain approved of and abetted this preponderance confident that she was the special junior partner.

The point of recalling these origins and earlier years of the alliance is that the basic assumptions which inspired its launching and sustained these early years are now widely challenged. Economically, there has been a considerable shift in the relative strengths of West Europe and the United States. Politically and militarily, there are many more assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities. Many informed Europeans, including some Britishers, think that the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States could prove more detrimental to European interests than the cold war. Perhaps neither the Soviet Union nor the United States regard themselves as having any deep interest in European union, the former principally for strategic, the latter for economic reasons. In any case, full-fledged union is a long way off still for intra-Common Market reasons alone.

Undoubtedly, however, efforts will be made to refurbish the meaning and morale of NATO for its members; but the intra-alliance discords generated by the latest round of the Middle East crisis and its immediate aftermath are not going to be forgotten quickly or easily because an assertion of quite distinct state interests was revealed. It cannot be said then that this troubled transatlantic partnership is continuing its various strategic or economic negotiations with a concerted policy. Now for the first time, the member states are seriously confronting each other over what are vital national and collective interests. Britain and the governments of the other European NATO powers obviously must make a real effort to achieve a common front, and to heal their breach with the United States, since they have no desire to do without the reassurance of the American military presence and nuclear defense in Europe. At the same time, they have to face the possibility that, in the future, the West Europeans will have to be more self-reliant in defense matters than they have been in the past 25 years. Undoubtedly the Jackson-Nunn amendment is facing West Europe with the prospect of significant United States troop withdrawals unless the European allies provide more to meet American estimates of the foreign exchange costs of these troops.

Thus, just when the United States is restlessly seeking to reduce its military commitments in Europe, Britain is intensifying her connections with her West

European neighbors. American military power remains the chief British prop and concern in NATO, but it is probable that the policies of the major West European powers—especially Germany and France—will increase in relative importance for Britain while the policies of the United States decline. In this respect, it will be interesting to see if and how Anglo-French nuclear cooperation proceeds in the immediate future, and whether, in the event of such cooperation, it is represented as complementary with or as an alternative to what either power would do either singly or in tandem with the United States.

Furthermore, in this age which has witnessed such an increase in the incidence and sophistication of skyjacking, insurgencies, urban terrorism, conspiracies and subversion, even an armchair strategist knows that the security concerns of governments and societies have widened to include protection against a very wide range of purposive threats or actual employment of physical force in an adversary way. Thus, there may well be relatively uncharted fields for future Anglo-American cooperation in areas of converging general concerns with security aspects—concerning, for instance, such matters as the quality of life, the defense of national assets, combating terrorism, transnationality, and promoting common interests in a better world economic system.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC TIES

In March, 1973, the British Ambassador to the United States, the Earl of Cromer, told a visiting British Sub-Committee of the House of Commons that fostering Anglo-American trade relations was probably the most important of all his tasks, and "If that were to collapse then everything else would collapse with it." He went on to illustrate this claim in a way that stressed how important were basic attitudes and assumptions. In particular the ambassador made two points.

1. That Americans look almost exclusively at their trade balances and omit the fact that invisible earnings on interests, dividends and profits (always an important dimension in any British balance-of-payments account) now bring in about \$12 billion a year gross and that these have gone up by about 270 percent in the past decade. United States foreign trade is only about 4.5 percent of GNP while the corresponding British figure is between 20 and 25 percent.

2. That the United States government is "extremely conscious" of its current balance-of-payments deficit. Cromer stressed that this was in reality a very recent adverse trade balance, mainly with Japan and Canada, and that until 1972 the United States had had a trade surplus with Europe for over a decade averaging over a billion dollars a year.

Ever since the eighteenth century, there has been some real meaning to the phrase, "an Atlantic econ-

omy." Until 1914, British investment played an eminent role in developing the American economy. Since 1957, the United States has been Britain's largest single market and source of supply. The economic relationship between the two countries has been and is enormously important, especially to Britain. These economic links have generated much more open resentment and recriminations than have the political and strategic ones: whether the points at issue have been postwar loans, or the connections between the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies, the financial activities of multinational corporations with American headquarters, or the vulnerability of Threadneedle Street to happenings on Wall Street.

In the past decade, American investment and in particular American banks have played an increasingly important role in the British economy.

Even on their own, some of the London branches of American banks would rank high nowadays in any listing of world banks. Banker's Trust London operation, for example, has assets of about \$2000mn, and the London branches of Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty, and First National City Bank are larger still. Most of these big banks have had a London presence since the beginning of this century. Morgan Guaranty and Chase have in fact been in London since the late 1880's, and Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover, and Bankers Trust have all been in London for over 50 years.

Until the middle 1960's, these banks were involved in modest sterling business, financing North American trade, lending to a number of British subsidiaries of United States companies, and offering personal banking services to American expatriates living in London. This kind of business produced merely steady and unexciting profits.

Then, in the late 1960's, came the hectic growth of the Eurodollar market, and United States banks poured into London. In 1960, 10 United States banks had London offices. By 1969, the number had risen to 32, and today there are 55 banks directly represented in the City, 39 of which have full branches. United States banks now account for roughly a quarter of all foreign banks in the City. Indeed, there are now more American banks in London than there are in New York. United States banks lend four times as much to United Kingdom residents as do the London clearing banks and, in fact, now account for 40 percent of the total currency advances made by banks from British soil.

The value of the pound sterling when compared with the dollar is, of course, of critical importance for Britain. For the dollar is the currency of the one country which could be almost self-sufficient in fuel and is least dependent on international trade of all the main oil-consuming countries. At the end of 1973, all indications were that the dollar was making

a spectacular recovery of strength in international money markets, after being heavily oversold during the two previous years. Many commodity prices, oil in particular, are fixed in dollar terms. Thus any depreciation of the sterling-dollar rate magnifies still further rises in oil prices. It also raises the cost of meeting the guarantees given to holders of official sterling.

For example, between September and December, 1973, since guarantees were given in terms of dollars at \$2.4312 to the pound, the pound had fallen 15 cents (this in a country where, as 1973 ended, industry faced a three-day work week, severe credit controls had been imposed, huge cutbacks in public spending had been ordered, general restrictions had been placed on heating and lighting, petrol ration-books had been issued and a maximum 50-miles-an-hour speed limit had been imposed on all vehicular traffic).

THE FUTURE?

The deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bureaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recognized. The solution of immediate issues has priority over the shaping of the future.

These words were written by Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger ten years ago, before events catapulted him to the prominence of chief adviser to the President on foreign policy and then to the post of Secretary of State. But what Henry Kissinger said then about the troubled partnership applies with particular pertinence today and in the immediate future.

Kissinger was surely right in warning about the myopia of being preoccupied with the present, even though few present-day leaders would find comfort
(Continued on page 132)

Peter Lyon is Secretary of and Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and an active member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He also engages in much freelance writing, lecturing and broadcasting. He is the author of several books and numerous publications on international politics, including a forthcoming book, *War and Peace in World Politics* (to be published in New York by John Wiley and Sons). A frequent visitor to the United States, he has taught at the University of California at Los Angeles, Cornell and the University of Pennsylvania; he has also lectured at many other American universities, Staff Colleges and research institutes.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE UNITED KINGDOM

HEAVEN'S COMMAND: AN IMPERIAL PROGRESS. BY JAMES MORRIS. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book, 1973. 554 pages and index, \$11.50.)

In *Heaven's Command* James Morris has written a book which could be variously described as a narrative picture, a series of pictorial anecdotes, or perhaps most accurately, "An Imperial Progress," as the work's subtitle tells us. In scene after little scene, in miniature character studies, in descriptions of seemingly isolated events, Morris traces the development of the British Empire from the almost accidental remnants of its earlier colonial system to the last "scramble for Africa." The period involved is the reign of Queen Victoria from her accession to the throne at the age of 18, to the Diamond Jubilee—from 1837 to 1897.

Morris makes no pretence that *Heaven's Command* is a work of historical research and no apology is necessary. Original research, he says, "... has mostly been confined to the quest of the wanderer's eye." For his eye, students of history, and all others who would like to taste the flavor of Victoria's empire, must remain grateful. The views presented are stunning. Taken together, they provide a critical but loving picture of Great Britain at the height of her power. Taken separately, they provide vivid insights into the development of the imperial mentality.

Morris divides his period into three parts, "The Sentiment of Empire: 1837-1850," "The Growing Conviction: 1850-1870," and "The Imperial Obsession: 1870-1897." Each section contains intimate descriptions of representative people, places and events which are made even more intimate by Morris' description of the locals as they are today. In this respect, the book profits immeasurably from the author's wide experience as a correspondent and traveler.

The first section begins, appropriately, with a description of the Honorable Emily Eden, sister of the Governor-General of India, and of her reaction to India and to the accession of Victoria to the British throne. The empire Victoria was to rule is described by Morris as an empire "... of sorts, an inchoate collection of territories acquired in bits and pieces over the generations, ... an unsystematic affair, an empire in abeyance, possessing no unity of purpose or sense of whole. ...". The attitude of the government is typified by Lord Melbourne

the Prime Minister. "How could one be expected to show an interest in a country like Canada ...," he demanded, "... where a salmon would not rise to a fly?"

Although this type of reaction appears to have remained an essential part of the British imperial attitude, necessity, particularly that of the missionary spirit, helped in the sometimes reluctant, often haphazard, growth of empire. Morris places a great deal of emphasis on this backbone of missionary zeal which grew partly out of worldwide enforcement of the abolition of slavery but primarily out of a rationalization of "... the instinct of empire ... as a call to Christian duty." In the second section of *Heaven's Command*, he traces the development of Christian duty into the conviction that it was the peculiar charge of the British Empire to bring the benefits of its civilization to the rest of the world.

The third stage, "The Imperial Obsession," is perhaps the saddest of the pictures painted by Morris. By this time, a large part of the empire appears to have existed only to service other parts of itself. Thus, control of Egypt and the Suez Canal was necessary to safeguard the route to India, and coaling stations were necessary throughout the world to support the new, steam-powered navy. This was the period during which Sir Theophilus Shepstone was sent as Special Commissioner to the South African Republic and ended up annexing it. Morris' description of the man is instructive:

There he goes along the dusty road to the capital, in many ways the archetype of the British imperialist in Africa—shrewd, calculating, pious, half-educated, overbearing, elated by his recent KCMG and accompanied by his private secretary Rider Haggard ("a leggy-looking youth," as was said at the time, "who seems the picture of weakness and dullness").

Morris ends his work with an account of the celebration of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. It is a fitting end to a superb description of an imperial period which, almost unknown to itself, was rapidly drawing to a close. The scope of the work is vast for one volume but the tightly knit descriptive passages of the minute, as well as the grand, enterprises of the empire, blend easily into the whole. *Heaven's Command* is exciting reading. It is also an excellent description of an important historical period.

Timothy L. Thompson
National Law Center
George Washington University

UDI, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE RHODESIAN REBELLION. By ROBERT C. GOOD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. 368 pages, bibliographical notes and index, \$12.50.)

From March, 1965, to December 1, 1968, Robert C. Good served as United States Ambassador to Zambia. This was a marvelous vantage-point from which to observe the historic events in Rhodesia following the "unilateral declaration of independence" of the British self-governing colony of Rhodesia by her Prime Minister, Ian Smith, on November 11, 1965.

In Rhodesia the "central issue had to do with the allocation of power in a situation where the contending sides were sharply demarcated by colour. UDI and the uproar accompanying it sprang from the question: who would rule an independent Rhodesia, the black majority (95 percent) or the white minority (5 percent)?"

From the beginning of the occupation of the area that is now Rhodesia, the authority of the British Crown has been limited. It was the company chartered by Cecil Rhodes which opened up the resources of the country, collected taxes and performed all the normal governmental functions. Also dating from her early beginnings are ties with South Africa that have been tremendously important since the rise of black nationalism in the 1950's. The realities of kindred interests with the white minority of South Africa opened up and eventually severed the long-cherished ties to the mother country and the Commonwealth. Good gives a lengthy and interesting history of the course of events which led to 1965. The new constitution for Rhodesia, adopted under the guidance of Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth Secretary, would have eventually led to rule by the black majority. Nonetheless, growing African and white extremism led to UDI.

In 1971, Britain and Rhodesia came to an agreement on new proposals which obtained some concessions from Ian Smith's ruling group and some from the African group which essentially again postponed the arrival of majority rule to some far-distant future. British leaders hopefully thought the Rhodesian problem was solved. But African protest over the settlement terms, as determined by the commission headed by Lord Pearce, was so strong against acceptance of the proposals that Britain once again was forced to let Rhodesia try to solve her own problems.

The author feels that the reckoning which must eventually take place in this ethnic struggle and others across the globe will affect "regions far

from Southern Africa . . . perhaps Britain and America." O.E.S.

SOUTHERN ENGLAND: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL GUIDE. By JAMES DYER. (Park Ridge, N.J.: Noyes Press, 1974. 380 pages and index, \$16.00.)

This is an informative and interesting guide to English history prior to Roman times. There are many amateur explorers of England's past and this will be of immense help to them in their efforts to search out the remains of the past. O.E.S.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND. By J. R. JONES. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1973. 345 pages, bibliography and index, \$11.95.)

J. R. Jones analyzes the events leading to the flight of James II to France and the new era beginning with William and Mary. O.E.S.

EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONISM. By ERIC JACOBS. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1973. 180 pages and index, \$12.95.)

Eric Jacobs, labor editor of the *Sunday Times* (London), describes the strength and role of trade unions in European countries, with particular emphasis on Britain. The study is particularly valuable because it provides background for the labor troubles bedeviling Britain at this particular time. O.E.S.

ENGLISHMEN AND IRISH TROUBLES. By D. G. BOYCE. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972. 253 pages, notes, biographical notes, and index, \$10.00.)

With a partial solution to the British-Irish problem apparently at hand in the Ulster Accord of December, 1973, it is interesting to read of an earlier period, 1918-1922, when Lloyd George's government was preparing the draft constitution to initiate the Irish Free State, thus initiating the Irish civil war. O.E.S.

TO TAKE ARMS: MY YEAR WITH THE IRA PROVISIONALS. By MARIA MCGUIRE. (New York: The Viking Press, 1973. 185 pages and chronology, \$6.95.)

This is the story of a year spent with the IRA Provisionals, the guerrilla group operating in Northern Ireland, by Maria McGuire, a university-educated Dubliner. O.E.S.

THE ULSTER DEBATE. By J. C. BECKETT *et al.* (Levittown, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, Inc., 1973. 160 pages and appendices, \$4.75.)

Commissioned by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, this book deals with the historical background and the vital aspects of the Irish problems confronting Ireland and the United Kingdom.

O.E.S.

STATE OF DISUNION. By CARLTON YOUNGER. (Levittown, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, Inc., 1973. 349 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$9.95.)

Carlton Younger examines the role and importance of Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, James Craig and Éamon de Valéra in the history of the Irish troubles since 1921.

O.E.S.

THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN. By CHRISTOPHER HILL. (New York: The Viking Press, 1972. 351 pages and index, \$10.95.)

Christopher Hill has written a fascinating account of the religious and political ideas of the extreme left of the English Puritan movement that was part of the force that removed Charles I from the throne of England.

O.E.S.

BRITAIN AND THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1937-1939. By BRADFORD A. LEE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973. 319 pages, notes, biographical notes and index, \$10.00.)

Basing his research on largely unpublished British Foreign Office and Cabinet records, the author examines the road to war of China and Japan, and the subsequent decline of Britain as an Asian power.

O.E.S.

BRITAIN AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970's. By SHERWOOD S. CORDIER. (Jericho, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1973. 63 pages, appendices, notes and index, \$6.00.)

This is a brief outline of the British military position in the 1970's. The author regards Britain as essential for the security of West Europe, declaring that "England is the most potent military power among the Western European nations today." Appendices list the key weapons systems in the British arsenal as of late 1972.

O.E.S.

MARXISM AND THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH SOCIALISM. By STANLEY PIERSON. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. 290 pages and index, \$10.75.)

Professor Pierson describes the complex process by which Marxist ideas became adopted into the various types of British socialism and how they found support among the working classes.

O.E.S.

BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY EAST OF SUEZ, 1947-1968. By PHILLIP DARBY. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973. 334 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

This history of Britain's defense role east of Suez in the 20 years under consideration is a detailed and scholarly analysis of the British position.

O.E.S.

BLACK BRITISH, WHITE BRITISH. By DILIP HIRO. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 330 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

Focusing on the problems of nonwhite, non-European Britishers, the author studies the problems faced by the West Indians, the Asians, and white British society and suggests social pluralism as the solution for the problems of the white host British and the black immigrants.

O.E.S.

MISCELLANY

THE AFRO-ASIAN MOVEMENT. By DAVID KIMCHE. (New York: Halsted Press, 1973. 296 pages, appendix, bibliography, and index, \$16.95.)

This study traces the origins and evolution of the Afro-Asian movement. The material is largely familiar, though there are a few vignettes of interest. The author suggests that the movement may survive its internationalist phase by focusing on regional problems and cooperation.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

AMERICAN MILITARY COMMITMENTS ABROAD. By ROLAND A. PAUL. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973. 237 pages, appendix, bibliography, and index, \$10.00.)

The growing significance of the military in American foreign policy making is brought into sharp focus in this insightful examination of United States overseas military commitments. A series of chapters examines the nature of America's agreements with countries such as South Korea, Thailand, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Japan. The book brings together a great deal of factual information and should be useful for anyone interested in United States foreign policy. There is one glaring omission: the absence of any analysis of the United States "commitment" to Israel.

A.Z.R.

THE JEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 1860-1972. By HAYYIM J. COHEN. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 213 pages, bibliography, and index, \$12.50.)

Of the 450,000 Jews in the Middle East in 1947,
(Continued on page 135)

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Sunningdale Communiqué on Ireland

Talks between the British government, the government of the Republic of Ireland and the Executive-designate of Northern Ireland were held at Sunningdale, Berkshire, England, December 6 to December 9, 1973. At their conclusion, separate declarations on the status of Northern Ireland were signed by the British and Irish governments. These were to be incorporated into a joint document to be registered at the United Nations after it is signed early in the new year. Meanwhile, the two declarations were included in a communiqué which was issued at the end of the conference. The full text of the communiqué follows:

1. The conference between the British and Irish Governments and the Parties involved in the Northern Ireland Executive (designate) met at Sunningdale on 6, 7, 8 and 9 December, 1973.
2. During the Conference, each delegation stated their position on the status of Northern Ireland.
3. The Taoiseach [Irish Republican Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave] said that the basic principle of the conference was that the participants had tried to see what measure of agreement of benefit to all the people concerned could be secured. In doing so, all had reached accommodation with one another on practical arrangements. But none had compromised and none had asked others to compromise, in relation to basic aspirations. The people of the Republic, together with a minority in Northern Ireland as represented by the SDLP [the Catholic Social Democratic and Labour party] delegation, continued to uphold the aspiration towards a united Ireland. The only unity they wanted to see was a unity established by consent.
4. Mr. Brian Faulkner [former Prime Minister of Northern Ireland] said that delegates from Northern Ireland came to the conference as representatives of apparently incompatible sets of political aspirations who had found it possible to reach agreement to join together in government because each accepted that in doing so they were not sacrificing principles or aspirations. The desire of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, as represented by the Unionist and Alliance delegations, remained firm.
5. The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status. The British Government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, their policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish.
6. The conference agreed that a formal agreement incorporating the declarations of the British and Irish Governments would be signed at the formal stage of the conference and registered at the United Nations.
7. The conference agreed that a Council of Ireland would be set up. It would be confined to representatives of the two parts of Ireland, with appropriate safeguards for the British Government's financial and other interests. It would comprise of a Council of Ministers with executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a Consultative Assembly with advisory and review functions. The Council of Ministers would act by unanimity, and would comprise a core of seven members of the Irish Government and an equal number of members of the Northern Ireland Executive with provision for the participation of other non-voting members of the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive or Administration when matters within their departmental competence were discussed. The Council of Ministers would control the functions of the Council. The chairmanship would rotate on an agreed basis between representatives of the Irish Government and of the Northern Ireland Executive. Arrangements would be made for the location of the first meeting and the location of subsequent meetings

would be determined by the Council of Ministers. The Consultative Assembly would consist of 60 members, 30 members from Dail Eireann [the Parliament of the Irish Republic] chosen by the Dail on the basis of proportional representation by the Single Transferable Vote, and 30 members from the Northern Ireland Assembly chosen by that Assembly and also on that basis. The members of the Consultative Assembly would be paid allowances. There would be a Secretariat to the Council, which would be kept as small as might be commensurate with efficiency in the operation of the Council. The Secretariat would service the institutions of the Council and would, under the Council of Ministers, supervise the carrying out of the Executive and harmonising functions and the consultative role of the Council. The Secretariat would be headed by a Secretary-General. Following the appointment of a Northern Ireland Executive, the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive would nominate their representatives to a Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers would then appoint a Secretary-General and decide upon the location of its permanent headquarters. The Secretary-General would be directed to proceed with the drawing up of plans for such headquarters. The Council of Ministers would also make arrangements for the recruitment of the staff of the Secretariat in a manner and on conditions which would, as far as is practicable, be consistent with those applying to public servants in the two Administrations.

8. In the context of its harmonising functions and consultative role, the Council of Ireland would undertake important work relating, for instance, to the impact of EEC membership. As for executive functions, the first step would be to define and agree on these in detail. The conference therefore decided that, in view of the administrative complexities involved, studies would at once be set in hand to identify and, prior to the formal stage of the conference, report on areas of common interest in relation to which a Council of Ireland would take executive decisions, and, in appropriate cases, be responsible for carrying those decisions into effect. In carrying out these studies, and also in determining what should be done by the Council in terms of harmonisation, the objectives to be borne in mind would include the following:

- i. To achieve the best utilisation of scarce skills, expertise and resources;
- ii. To avoid, in the interests of economy and efficiency, unnecessary duplication of effort; and
- iii. To insure complementary rather than competitive effort where this is to the advantage of agriculture, commerce and industry.

In particular, these studies would be directed to identifying, for the purposes of executive action by

the Council of Ireland, suitable aspects of activities in the following broad fields:

- a) Exploration, conservation and development of natural resources and the environment;
- b) Agricultural matters (including agricultural research, animal health and operational aspects of the common agriculture policy), forestry and fisheries;
- c) Cooperative ventures in the field of trade and industry;
- d) Electricity generation;
- e) Tourism;
- f) Roads and transport;
- g) Advisory services in the field of public health;
- h) Sport, culture and the arts.

It would be for the Oireachtas [Dail Eireann] and the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate from time to time as to the extent of functions to be devolved to the Council of Ireland. Where necessary, the British Government will cooperate in this devolution of functions. Initially, the functions to be vested would be those identified in accordance with the procedures set out above and decided, at the formal stage of the conference, to be transferred.

9. (i) During the initial period following the establishment of the Council, the revenue of the Council would be provided by means of grants from the two Administrations in Ireland towards agreed projects and budgets, according to the nature of the service involved.

(ii) It was also agreed that further studies would be put in hand forthwith and completed as soon as possible of methods of financing the Council after the initial period which would be consonant with the responsibilities and functions assigned to it.

(iii) It was agreed that the cost of the Secretariat of the Council of Ireland would be shared equally, and other services would be financed broadly in proportion to where expenditure or benefit accrues.

(iv) The amount of money required to finance the Council's activities will depend upon the functions assigned to it from time to time.

(v) While Britain continues to pay subsidies to Northern Ireland, such payments would not involve Britain's participating in the Council, it being accepted nevertheless that it would be legitimate for Britain to safeguard in an appropriate way her financial involvement in Northern Ireland.

10. It was agreed by all parties that persons committing crimes of violence, however motivated, in any part of Ireland should be brought to trial irrespective of the part of Ireland in which they are located. The concern which large sections of the people of Northern Ireland felt about this problem was in particular forcefully expressed by the representatives of the Unionist and Alliance Parties. The representa-

tives of the Irish Government stated that they understood and fully shared this concern. Different ways of solving this problem were discussed; among them were the amendment of legislation operating in the two jurisdictions on extradition, the creation of a common law enforcement area in which an all-Ireland Court would have jurisdiction, and the extension of the jurisdiction of domestic courts so as to enable them to try offences committed outside the jurisdiction. It was agreed that problems of considerable legal complexity were involved and that the British and Irish Governments would jointly set up a Commission to consider all the proposals put forward at the conference and to recommend as a matter of extreme urgency the most effective means of dealing with those who commit these crimes. The Irish Government undertook to take immediate and effective legal steps so that persons coming within their jurisdiction and accused of murder, however motivated, committed in Northern Ireland will be brought to trial, and it was agreed that any similar reciprocal action that may be needed in Northern Ireland be taken by the appropriate authorities.

11. It was agreed that the Council would be invited to consider in what way the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would be exercised in domestic legislation in each part of Ireland. It would recommend whether further legislation or the creation of other institutions, administrative or judicial, is required in either part or embracing the whole island to provide additional protection in the field of human rights. Such recommendations could include the functions of an Ombudsman or Commissioner for Complaints, or other arrangements of a similar nature which the Council of Ireland might think appropriate.

12. The conference also discussed the question of policing and the need to ensure public support for and identification with the police service throughout the whole community. It was agreed that no single set of proposals would achieve these aims overnight, and that time would be necessary. The conference expressed the hope that the wide range of agreement that had been reached, and the consequent formation of a power-sharing executive, would make a major contribution to the creation of an atmosphere throughout the community where there would be widespread support for an identification with all the institutions of Northern Ireland.

13. It was broadly accepted that the two parts of Ireland are to a considerable extent inter-dependent in the whole field of law and order, and that the problems of political violence and identification with the police service cannot be solved without taking account of that fact.

14. Accordingly, the British Government stated that, as soon as the security problems were resolved and the new institutions were seen to be working effectively, they would wish to discuss the devolution of responsibility for normal policing and how this might be achieved with the Northern Ireland Executive and the Police.

15. With a view to improving policing throughout the island and developing community identification with and support for the police services, the Governments concerned will cooperate under the auspices of a Council of Ireland through their respective Police Authorities. To this end, the Irish Government would set up a Police Authority, appointments to which would be made after consultation with the Council of Ministers of the Council of Ireland. In the case of the Northern Ireland Police Authority, appointments would be made after consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive, which would consult with the Council of Ministers of the Council of Ireland. When the two police authorities are constituted, they will make their own arrangements to achieve the objectives set out above.

16. An independent complaints procedure for dealing with complaints against the police will be set up.

17. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will set up an all-Party committee from the Assembly to examine how best to introduce effective policing throughout Northern Ireland with particular reference to the need to achieve a public identification with the police.

18. The conference took note of a reaffirmation by the British Government of their firm commitment to bring detention to an end in Northern Ireland for all sections of the community as soon as the security situation permits, and noted also that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland hopes to be able to bring into use his statutory powers of selective release in time for a number of detainees to be released before Christmas.

19. The British Government stated that, in the light of the decisions reached at the conference, they would now seek the authority of Parliament to devolve full powers to the Northern Ireland Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly as soon as possible; the formal appointment of the Northern Ireland Executive would then be made.

20. The conference agreed that a formal conference would be held early in the New Year at which the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive would meet together to consider reports on the studies which have been commissioned and to sign the agreement reached.

President Nixon's State of the Union Message

On January 30, 1974, President Richard Nixon delivered a State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress. The nationally televised speech was a summary of a much longer printed message the President sent Congress. Excerpts from the spoken address follow:

We meet here tonight at a time of great challenge and great opportunities for America. We meet at a time when we face great problems at home and abroad that will test the strength of our fiber as a nation. But we also meet at a time when that fiber has been tested, and it has proved strong.

Tonight, for the first time in 12 years, a President of the United States can report to the Congress on the state of a union at peace with every nation of the world. Because of this, in the 22,000-word message on the state of the union that I have just handed to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, I have been able to deal primarily with the problems of peace—with what we can do here at home in America for the American people—rather than with the problems of war.

After more than 10 years of military involvement, all of our troops have returned from Southeast Asia and they have returned with honor. And we can be proud of the fact that our courageous prisoners of war, for whom a dinner was held in Washington tonight, that they came home with their heads high, on their feet and not on their knees.

In our relations with the Soviet Union, we have turned away from a policy of confrontation to one of negotiation. For the first time since World War II, the world's two strongest powers are working together towards peace in the world. With the People's Republic of China, after a generation of hostile isolation, we have begun a period of peaceful exchange and expanding trade.

Peace has returned to our cities, to our campuses. The 17-year rise in crime has been stopped.

We have organized a massive national effort to protect the environment. Our air is getting cleaner. Our water is getting purer, and our agriculture, which was depressed, is prospering. Farm income is up 70 percent, farm production is setting all-time records, and the billions of dollars the taxpayers were paying in subsidies has been cut to nearly zero.

Overall, Americans are living more abundantly than ever before today. More than 2½ million new jobs were created in the past year alone. That is the biggest percentage increase in nearly 20 years. People are earning more. But what they earn buys more, more than ever before in history. In the past five years the average American's real spendable income, that is what you really can buy with your income even after allowing for taxes and inflation, has increased by 16 percent.

Despite this record of achievement, as we turn to the year ahead we hear once again the familiar voice of the perennial prophets of gloom telling us now that because of the need to fight inflation, because of the energy shortage, America may be headed for a recession.

Let me speak to that issue head on. There will be no recession in the United States of America. Primarily due to our energy crisis, our economy is passing through a difficult period. But I pledge to you tonight that the full powers of this government will be used to keep America's economy producing and to protect the jobs of America's workers.

Looking at the year 1974, which lies before us, there are 10 key areas in which landmark accomplishments are possible this year in America. If we make these our national agenda, this is what we will achieve in 1974:

We will break the back of the energy crisis, we will lay the foundation for our future capacity to meet America's energy needs from America's own resources.

And we will take another giant stride toward lasting peace in the world—not only by continuing our policy of negotiation rather than confrontation where the great powers are concerned, but also by helping toward the achievement of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

We will check the rise in prices, without administering the harsh medicine of recession and we will move the economy into a steady period of growth at a sustainable level.

We will establish a new system that makes high-quality health care available to every American in a dignified manner and at a price he can afford.

We will make our states and localities more responsive to the needs of their own citizens.

We will make a crucial breakthrough toward better transportation in our towns and cities across America.

We will reform our system of federal aid to education, to provide it when it is needed, where it is needed, so that it will do the most for those who need it the most.

We will make an historic beginning on the task of defining and protecting the right of privacy for every American.

And we will start on a new road toward reform of a welfare system that bleeds the taxpayer, corrodes the community and demeans those it is intended to assist.

And together with the other nations of the world, we will establish the economic framework within which Americans will share more fully in an expanding worldwide trade and prosperity in the years ahead, with more open access to both markets and supplies.

The new legislation I have requested will also remain necessary. Therefore, I urge again that the energy measures I have proposed be made the first priority of this session of the Congress. These measures will require the oil companies and other energy producers to provide the public with the necessary information on their supplies. They will prevent the injustice of a windfall for a few as a result of the sacrifices of millions of Americans and they will give us the organization, the incentives, the authorities

needed to deal with the short-term emergency and to move toward meeting our long-term needs.

Turning now to the rest of the agenda for 1974, the time is at hand, this year, to bring comprehensive, high-quality health care within the reach of every American. I shall propose a sweeping new program that will assure comprehensive health insurance protection to millions of Americans who cannot now obtain it or afford it with vastly improved protection against catastrophic illness. This will be a plan that maintains the high standards of quality in America's health care. And it will not require additional taxes.

I think all of us recognize that the energy crisis has given new urgency for the need to improve public transportation, not only in our cities but in rural areas as well. The program I have proposed this year will give communities not only more money, but also more freedom to balance their own transportation needs. It will mark the strongest federal commitment ever to the improvement of mass transit as an essential element of the improvement of life in our towns and cities.

In a special message last week, I recommended a number of important new measures that can make 1974 a year of truly significant advances for our schools, and for the children they serve. If the Congress will act on these proposals, more flexible funding will enable each federal dollar to meet better the particular needs of each school district.

I shall launch an effort this year at the highest levels of the administration and I look forward again to working with this Congress and establishing a new set of standards that respect the legitimate needs of society, but that also recognize personal privacy as a cardinal principle of American liberty.

In these final three years of my administration, I urge the Congress to join me in mounting a major new effort to replace the discredited present welfare system with one that works, one that is fair to those who need help or cannot help themselves, fair to the community, and fair to the taxpayer. And let us have as our goal that there will be no government program which makes it more profitable to go on welfare than to go to work.

It is vital that the authorities contained in the trade bill I submitted to the Congress be enacted so that the United States can negotiate flexibly and vigorously on behalf of American interests. These negotiations can usher in a new era of international trade that not only increases the prosperity of all nations, but also strengthens the peace among all nations.

In the past five years, we have steadily reduced the burden of national defense as a share of the budget bringing it down from 44 percent in 1969 to 29 percent in the current year. We have cut our military manpower over the past five years by more than a third, from 3½ million to 2 2/10 million.

In this year 1974 we will be negotiating with the Soviet Union to place further limits on strategic nuclear arms. Together with our allies, we will be negotiating with the nations of the Warsaw Pact on mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe. We will continue our efforts to promote peaceful economic development in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia. We will press for full compliance with the peace accords that brought an end to American fighting in Indochina, including particularly a provision that promised the fullest accounting for those Americans who are missing in action.

I would like to add a personal word with regard to an issue that has been of great concern to all Americans over the past year. I refer, of course, to the investigations of the so-called Watergate affair.

I believe the time has come to bring that investigation and the other investigations of this matter to an end. One year of Watergate is enough.

I recognize that the House Judiciary Committee has a special responsibility in this area, and I want to indicate on this occasion that I will cooperate with the Judiciary Committee in its investigation. I will cooperate so that it can conclude its investigation, make its decision, and I will cooperate in any way I consider consistent with my responsibilities to the office of the presidency of the United States.

Another point I should like to make very briefly. Like every member of the House and Senate assembled here tonight, I was elected to the office that I hold. And like every member of the House and Senate when I was elected to that office, I knew that I was elected for the purpose of doing a job and doing it as well as I possibly can. And I want you to know that I have no intention whatever of ever walking away from the job that the people elected me to do for the people of the United States.

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

(Continued from page 124)

in his injunction to pay heed to shaping the future even while they seek—unavoidably—to tackle immediate issues. Much, indeed, depends on the convictions and purpose of each generation that has to wrestle with its difficulties and opportunities. The recent whirligig of events should at least have made it impossible for either British or American leaders to fall into another trap that Kissinger warned about: of confusing “creativity with a projection of the present into the future.”

In diplomatic, strategic, and economic matters, the prospect for the immediate future is that Anglo-American considerations will be only one and often a lesser motif in a whole series of complex talks and negotiations involving the United States with all the countries of the European Community, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, as well as a considerable number of developing countries. This is the kind of multistory international chess-hall, with several players conducting different games on different boards simultaneously, in which Kissinger at least seems to revel, though so far his own diplomatic coups have been intensely secretive and essentially bilateral.

Even so, the record of the immediate past leaves one with grounds for doubt, and hope, that in the near future political leaders in Britain and the United States will be willing and able to work together closely and effectively on a range of important issues of vital mutual concern. There is enough in their record of past cooperation to provide grounds for hope; but past accomplishments are not enough to ensure anything substantial in the future. Practical and substantial Anglo-American cooperation is not a mere matter of mutual good will; still less is it foreordained. If it is to be achieved, Americans must not take Britons for granted; Britons must not take Americans for granted either.

THE BRITISH ECONOMY

(Continued from page 105)

... many have described the situation which we as a nation now face as by far the gravest since the end of the war. They do not exaggerate.¹⁴

In 1974 we will learn whether Britain slides over that precipice or makes it back to safe ground.

¹⁴ *The Times* (London), December 18, 1973.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE: A NEW RELATIONSHIP?

(Continued from page 115)

wealth countries. But any relationship of 600 years is noteworthy, and the chances of its being maintained would seem to be very good.

The future of British relations with Europe cannot easily be predicted. Some problems have already been mentioned. Others—such as regularizing the relationships between Britain and the remaining members of EFTA—could still be cited. But the solution of all such problems depends in the long run on the British political situation. The most important variable in British policy determination in any field just now is the strength of the Conservative party's grip on office. Another election must be held by 1975 and may, of course, come sooner. Should the Labour party win (and it might well), the entire picture of British action, both domestic and external, might drastically change.

At its annual conference in 1973, the Labour party renewed its earlier commitment to renegotiate the terms of British membership in the Common Market and to submit the final question of membership to a popular vote. In any case, the EEC will be at issue

This conference declares its opposition to entry to the Common Market on the terms negotiated by the Tories and calls on a future Labour Government to reverse any decision for Britain to join unless new terms have been negotiated including the abandonment of the common agricultural policy and value added tax, no limitations on the freedom of a Labour Government to carry out economic planning, regional development, extension of the public sector, control of capital movement, and the preservation of the power of the British Parliament over its legislation and taxation, and meanwhile to halt immediately the entry arrangements and all payments to the European Communities and participation in their institutions, in particular the European Parliament, until such terms have been negotiated, and assent of the British electorate has been given.²⁵

²⁵ This resolution was carried at the Labour Party Conference in 1972.

in the forthcoming election because Prime Minister Heath and the Conservatives have put themselves on the line to support it, and realize the necessity of making it more popular in Britain than it is now, after a year in operation. They must face the fact that British entry into the Common Market has neither solved all her problems nor contributed much to the solution of Europe's problems. Inflation continues to mount, there is still a balance-of-payments problem, labor disputes continue, and prices still climb. The time of troubles for Britain seems to be upon her, and it would not be surprising if she were to alter some or all of her relations with Europe as she seeks to resolve her domestic problems.

No matter what happens at home, Britain appears to have gone too far now to abandon Europe. She would be the first to acknowledge that the days of going it alone are over. Despite United States President Richard Nixon's declaration of the "Year of Europe," which may come in 1974, it is not likely that the United States will take on much more responsibility for either Britain or Europe. And the Commonwealth is too tenuous to offer much hope for help.

Thus the die is cast. Britain has entered into a new stage of her age-old relationship with Europe, although it is too early yet to tell how that relationship will develop.

BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH

(Continued from page 110)

If Britain herself is still at the center of so widely shared a heritage—in the fields of education, culture, the professions, the arts of Parliament, in banking, commerce, industry and sport, through the press, broadcasting and television, through the work of innumerable voluntary and charitable societies or simply as the result of a myriad of personal links—where lies the shame in that?

As long as these links continue, the Commonwealth, as a comity of nation states—today increasingly realistic in their acceptance of what may unite or disjoin each of them politically but still bound together by history, shared enmities and sacrifice—may yet surprise historians and history alike. For their ability to have marched with and to have adapted to the times the British themselves may take some credit.

Today, from deliberate choice, Britain no longer claims the title *primus inter pares*. Big or small, rich or poor, black, brown or white, all partners in the Commonwealth now rank as equals. Each in some way draws strength and wisdom from his fellow members. The "British" Commonwealth has passed. But in its place there grows, fitfully perhaps but still with hope, a pilot project for the world itself—a multiracial Commonwealth of nation states.

BRITAIN AND IRELAND

(Continued from page 120)

consultations on the formation of the new Executive took place in October and November, and it met for the first time on January 1, 1974, under Faulkner's chairmanship.

Another aspect of the new legislation, which echoes the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, is the provision for a "Council of Ireland" to link North and South. This would be meaningless without the cooperation of the government of the Republic, but in a historic series of meetings at Sunningdale, December 7-9,¹² among Edward Heath and Irish Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave and Brian Faulkner, cooperation was promised. Among the tasks to which the new Council might turn its hand is the working out of the implications for all of Ireland of the fact that both the United Kingdom and the Republic are, since January 1, 1973, members of the European Common Market. The Council will comprise seven members from Northern Ireland and seven from the Republic, and will be assisted by a consultative assembly. Another most significant outcome of the Sunningdale meeting was the promise of common action against violent crimes—a point on which the government of the Republic has too often in the past acted ambiguously.

PROSPECTS

Violence continues in Northern Ireland, and the first days of 1974 were marked by it. Yet the most recent political developments are encouraging. Extremists on both sides seem to be steadily losing public support. Britain and the Republic are showing greater readiness to cooperate than they have done at any time in the past. If, as some observers think, a fair chance for jobs and housing is more important to the average Catholic in Northern Ireland than the mystical principle of the unity of Ireland, time and the new policies will produce a healing. There is sound reason in the current situation for being modestly hopeful.¹³

BRITISH POLITICS

(Continued from page 100)

1972, the opinion polls showed that those supporting British entry—42 percent—for the first time since 1969 equalled those opposing it. The deteriorating eco-

nomic situation, which pushed unemployment over the million mark early in 1972 and forced the government to "float" the pound sterling downwards in June, led to increasing public fears of massive increases in the cost of living as a result of British entry; there was subsequently a steady erosion in public support for Common Market membership. In the fall of 1973, after almost a year inside the European Community, support for British membership was expressed by only one-third of those polled, while more than half disapproved of British entry. At the same time, the proportion of people naming the cost of living as the most important problem facing the government rose from 24 percent in August, 1972, to over 60 percent in October, 1973.

During the first three years of the Heath administration, food prices increased by one-third and house prices more than doubled; in November, 1972, Heath abandoned his earlier opposition to price and wage controls by imposing a total freeze on both. In April, 1973, he introduced a Price Commission and Pay Board to determine acceptable price and pay increases within limits laid down by the government. Although the conversion of Prime Minister Heath to a policy of control over prices and wages was fiercely attacked by both right-wing Conservatives (Enoch Powell accused him of "taking leave of his senses"), and the Labour party—which noted that food prices remained uncontrolled and that the massive profits made by property speculators were exempt—there was general public support for these measures to control inflation, tempered by misgivings that the Heath government was at the mercy of events beyond its control.

There was, indeed, a growing popular cynicism regarding the quality of leadership provided by the leading politicians of both major parties; when Roy Jenkins resigned as deputy leader of the Labour party in April, 1972, because of his party's opposition to Common Market membership, he struck a sympathetic chord when he warned that: "If government is born out of opportunism it becomes not merely difficult but impossible to have a clear sense of direction." Shortly afterward, the Conservative Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, who was widely respected as a moderate and pragmatic politician, resigned because he had been a business associate of an architect who had been accused of corrupting public officials; and in the summer of 1973 two Conservative ministers, Lords Lambton and Jellicoe, resigned when their association with prostitutes was revealed. The frequent reversals of the Conservative government's policy on industrial relations, immigration, wage and price control, and state aid to industry left an impression of purposeless government matched only by memories of similar abrupt reversals under the Labour government which had preceded it. It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that a public opinion survey carried out by *The Times* (London) in the fall of 1972 showed that over one-

¹² For the text of the Sunningdale Communiqué, see pp. 128ff. of this issue.

¹³ For a lengthy and very intelligent discussion of possible "scenarios of the future" in Northern Ireland the interested reader is referred to O'Brien's *States of Ireland*, pp. 298-303. O'Brien also disposes, to my mind decisively, of the argument sometimes encountered that the struggle in Northern Ireland is not religious in nature, but is "really" about economics. See also two very intelligent articles in *World-view*, November and December, 1973, by Richard J. Neuhaus.

third of the electorate favored the creation of a non-socialist center party to oppose both Labour and Conservative parties.

The chief beneficiary of this disillusionment with the two major political parties was the Liberal party, which had suffered a steady decline in electoral support for over 50 years, and in the 1970 general election had only six candidates elected to the House of Commons. The Liberals, fighting on a platform of radical non-socialist policies involving political devolution and popular participation in decision-making, won five by-elections in 1972–1973, almost doubling their representation in Parliament. In the opinion polls, they soon began to share support almost equally with the two major parties. Although this upsurge in support for the Liberals, despite their lack of funds for publicity and a shortage of trained party workers, was partly attributable to their emphasis on “community politics” and the engaging personality of their leader, Jeremy Thorpe, it was much more a vote of no-confidence in the leadership of both the Labour and Conservative parties, and smacked of “a plague on both your houses” rather than the advent of a true multi-party system in Britain. The most disturbing aspect of the situation was the inability of the Labour party to present a credible alternative to Edward Heath’s administration, and to profit from dwindling public support for the Conservatives. Despite their phenomenal resurgence, it was clear that the Liberals lacked both the deep-rooted political support and the cadre of experienced politicians that would be necessary to provide a government capable of solving the problems confronting Britain in the years ahead.

When the political parties held their annual conferences in the fall of 1973, they tried to project their respective political images in anticipation of a general election early in 1974. The Liberals proposed to contain inflation by introducing a guaranteed minimum wage linked to rises in the cost-of-living index, to improve industrial relations by introducing worker participation in the overall control of companies, and to oppose any further extension of state ownership in industry. The Labour party, in an attempt to rekindle working class commitment in the face of increasing apathy, moved abruptly to the left with its proposals for raising taxation on all incomes over £7,200 a year (which would include many of the higher paid manual workers), the abolition of private education, renegotiation of the Common Market terms of membership, and a massive extension of state ownership not only over utilities but also over the most profitable sectors of the economy such as pharmaceuticals and banking.

Labour’s spokesman for industrial affairs, Tony Benn, pledged that the Labour party would not be swayed from its course by the economic crisis if it came to power, as had happened with the previous Labour government: “The crisis we inherit when we

come to power will be the occasion for fundamental change and not an excuse for postponing it.” The Conservatives, on the other hand, were equally enthusiastic in drawing up the battle lines for British politics in the years to come; Peter Walker, the Minister for Trade and Industry, expounded the concept of the “new capitalism” in which social responsibility and individual freedom would go hand in hand in a new form of industrial democracy:

The essential weakness of modern capitalism is that, despite outstanding successes, unparalleled in the history of man, in securing material improvement, as well as obtaining a degree of personal liberty unknown to previous generations, it has failed to generate ideological commitment.

The “new capitalism,” a partnership of government, employers and unions to provide continuing improvement of living standards and personal incentive for all (by eliminating the “outdated” predatory nature of capitalism and increasing worker involvement and participation in decision-taking), would seem to be more a state of mind than a program for action. All three parties claimed to have the answer to Britain’s ills; but it remains to be seen whether the British electorate, faced with the very real prospect of economic recession in 1974, is prepared to give more than grudging support to any of them. Certainly many of them would echo Yeats in feeling that 1974 is a time when:

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 127)

only 100,000 remain there today, and less than 10,000 in the Arab countries of the region. With meticulous care and commendable clarity, the author traces the virtual disappearance of Jewish communities in Moslem countries of the Middle East, especially in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Turkey. Those interested in the changing social history of the area will find this a very useful work.

A.Z.R.

WAR AND POLITICS. BY BERNARD BRODIE.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973. 514 pages, index, \$8.95.)

This is a far-ranging analysis of the political, strategic, and systemic parameters of war in our time. Deeply grounded in historical phenomena and technological change, it discusses the relationship between strategy and politics, using a critique of American foreign policy to illustrate the limits of power, the ambiguity of “national interest,” and the role of domestic politics. Specialists on international relations will find this a stimulating, indispensable work.

A.Z.R.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important dates of January, 1974, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Jan. 23—In Cairo, a 2-day conference of Arab oil ministers and representatives of 7 black African nations ends. The Secretary General of the League, Mahmoud Riad, announces that a recommendation will be made to Arab governments to establish a fund of \$200 million to help underdeveloped black African nations that have been hurt by oil price increases.

Disarmament

Jan. 17—The East-West talks on reducing armed forces in Central Europe resume in Vienna.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *Intl, Intl Monetary Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 15—The Council of Foreign Ministers of the 9 EEC states accepts United States President Richard Nixon's invitation to attend a conference on the energy crisis next month. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel of West Germany will represent the 9 member states.

Jan. 24—The executive commission of the Common Market suggests that member states use higher than official prices for gold in settling intergovernmental accounts. According to this proposal, central banks of Europe would settle accounts with each other in gold at prices bearing a close relationship to the price of gold on the free market, which is currently close to three times the official price.

International Monetary Crisis

Jan. 8—On the London and Zurich (Switzerland) bullion markets, gold sells for \$130 an ounce.

Jan. 19—French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announces that the franc will float freely on exchange markets for 6 months; he states that the removal of official French support for the franc is essential for maintaining French reserves. This act ends the Common Market's monetary agreement stipulating that no currency fluctuate more than 2¼ percent above or below any of the other EEC currencies. Currencies of all EEC members will now float freely.

Jan. 20—The finance ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, meeting in Antwerp,

decide to maintain joint floating of their currencies despite France's withdrawal from the EEC monetary system. Denmark, an EEC member, announces she will stay in the monetary system; Norway and Sweden, non-members who joined the monetary system in March, 1973, also declare that they will remain in the system.

Jan. 21—The French franc falls by 4 percent against the dollar. Gold sells at \$142 an ounce in London and Zurich.

International Monetary Fund

Jan. 18—In Rome, a committee of finance ministers of the IMF issues a communiqué stating that countries must cooperate and avoid policies that will have inflationary effects if the economic consequences of higher oil prices are to be ameliorated.

Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation

Jan. 24—A meeting of the second congress of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation opens in Rio de Janeiro. Over 200 persons from more than 20 different Latin American countries are attending the meetings.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Int, OPEC; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 3—A U.N. spokesman announces that yesterday Israeli troops refused to allow nonmilitary supplies to reach Egyptian Third Army elements that are cut off on the east bank of the Suez Canal; the Israelis claim that the Egyptians have fired on an Israeli bulldozer.

In Tel Aviv, an official source asserts that Israel will not allow supplies to reach Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez canal so long as Israeli forces are harassed.

Jan. 4—In Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan confer about the Geneva talks on the Middle East.

It is reported that the Israeli blockade of supplies to the Egyptian Third Army has ended.

Jan. 5—The U.N. Emergency Force reports that Israeli and Egyptian troops have fired on each other in and around the city of Suez.

Jan. 9—The Israeli and Egyptian military negotiators in Geneva suspend their talks on the separation of

troops along the Suez Canal for 6 days to allow their governments to make new political decisions that could affect a Middle East settlement.

Jan. 11—Kissinger arrives in Egypt and confers with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Jan. 12—Kissinger visits the Aswan High Dam; he later flies to Israel from Egypt and meets with Israeli leaders.

Jan. 13—The Israeli Cabinet approves the draft of a specific proposal for separating Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal. The Cabinet authorizes Kissinger to present the plan to Egyptian leaders. Kissinger arrives in Egypt to meet with Egyptian officials as part of his "shuttle diplomacy."

Jan. 14—Kissinger confers with Sadat; at night he returns to Israel with Sadat's counterproposal to the Israeli plan for disentangling troops.

Jan. 17—In Cairo, Jerusalem, and Washington, D.C., simultaneous announcements report that Egypt and Israel have reached an agreement on the separation of forces along the Suez Canal over a 40-day period. A second agreement, known as the "U.S. proposal," defines the deployment of military equipment in the area; this agreement is disclosed by U.S. officials in Jerusalem later in the day.

Jan. 18—The Middle East accord on separating Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal is signed in Jerusalem, in a U.N. tent at Kilometer 101 on the Suez-Cairo road, and at Aswan. The accord calls for Israeli withdrawal 15½ miles into the Sinai Peninsula just west of the Mitla and Gidi Passes. Immediately to the east of the canal, an Egyptian disengagement zone, 5 to 7 miles wide, will be established. Adjacent to that will be a U.N. buffer zone 3½ to 5 miles wide, and immediately to the east of the U.N. zone there will be an Israeli disengagement zone 5 to 7 miles wide. Arms build-up and deployment will be restricted within the Israeli and Egyptian disengagement zones. A secret arms control agreement is signed separately by Israeli Premier Golda Meir in Jerusalem and by President Sadat in Aswan. Speaking at a news conference after the signing, Sadat declares that he will urge Syria to open talks with Israel.

Jan. 19—In Damascus, President Sadat meets with President Hafez el-Assad of Syria on the Middle East accord; later he flies to Kuwait to confer with Kuwaiti ruler Sheik Sabah al-Salam al-Sabah.

Jan. 20—In Damascus, Kissinger confers with President Assad on separating Israeli and Syrian forces. Kissinger flies to Israel to inform Israeli leaders of Syrian proposals for troop disentanglement and for providing a list of Israeli prisoners held by Syria.

Jan. 23—Speaking in Rabat, Morocco, at the end of his 6-day tour of 8 Arab capitals, Egyptian President Sadat declares that Syria is willing to discuss the

separation of troops along the Golan Heights frontier.

In Tel Aviv, military sources report that Israeli troops on the west bank of the Suez Canal have begun to pull back to the Sinai Peninsula.

Jan. 24—General David Elazar, Israeli chief of staff, and Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy, Egyptian chief of staff, meet for 4½ hours in the United Nations tent at Kilometer 101 and complete the agreement on procedures and the timetable for the formal withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops on the Suez front. The process is to last 40 days.

Jan. 25—Israeli forces begin the formal withdrawal from the west bank of the Suez Canal.

Jan. 26—According to Arab diplomatic sources, Jordanian and Israeli negotiators are engaged in talks expected to lead to the disengagement of Israeli and Jordanian forces in the Jordan Valley.

Jan. 27—In spite of the cease-fire, Syrian and Israeli artillery engage in heavy artillery duels along the Golan Heights front.

Jan. 28—The Israeli army vacates territory around Suez City and frees the supply lines to the Egyptian Third Army on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Jan. 9—In Geneva, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ends a 3-day meeting. A communiqué is issued in which the members promise not to raise prices again in the next 3 months; OPEC members warn that future price levels will depend on the industrial nations' ability to control inflation and the profits of oil companies.

Jan. 27—Senior officials of the members of OPEC begin a lengthy session to determine the prices the group will charge for oil on April 1, 1974, and to decide on a long-term pricing policy.

War in Indochina

(See also *Laos*)

Jan. 4—The Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary government and the South Vietnamese government agree "in principle" to resume the prisoner exchange that was halted by a dispute in July, 1973.

Jan. 11—*The New York Times* reports that several thousand anti-government troops have intensified their offensive to force Cambodian President Lon Nol's government to resign; they have penetrated "sizable infantry forces within 6 miles of the city and within a mile of the principal airport at Pochentong."

Jan. 20—The Saigon military command announces that South Vietnamese ships and troops fought with a large Chinese naval and ground force yester-

day at an uninhabited island in the South China Sea. The South Vietnamese force retreats.

Jan. 21—In a final attack using MIG's and ground troops, Chinese forces take complete control of the Paracel Islands after ousting a small South Vietnamese force yesterday.

Jan. 28—More than 200 people have been killed in the last week in the continued shelling of Phnom Penh by insurgent forces, according to government reports. Government forces have been unable to mount a successful counteroffensive.

Jan. 29—The Cambodian command reports that its fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships made 67 sorties during the day to try to oust insurgent artillery near Phnom Penh.

ARGENTINA

Jan. 24—8 members of the Chamber of Deputies affiliated with the leftist Peronist Youth Group resign to express opposition to the new anti-guerrilla law expected to be passed by the legislature.

Jan. 25—The Peronist-controlled legislature passes a controversial bill designed to control terrorism; opponents of the measure fear it will also be used to stifle legitimate political dissent.

Jan. 29—Finance Minister José Gelbard notes that smuggling of food out of Argentina has reached an annual rate of \$300 million yearly; smuggling is seen as a response to the government's severe price controls.

BELGIUM

Jan. 19—Premier Edmond Leburton and his 3-party coalition government resign, after Iran pulled out of an oil refinery project in eastern Belgium.

Jan. 26—A Christian Socialist, Leo Tindemans, is appointed by King Baudouin as Premier-designate and asked to form a Cabinet.

Jan. 29—Premier-designate Leo Tindemans reports to King Baudouin that he is unable to form a coalition Cabinet. As a result King Baudouin dissolves Parliament, calling for new elections within 40 days. March 10 is mentioned as a likely date.

BOLIVIA

Jan. 28—General Hugo Banzer Suarez, the President, declares a state of emergency as thousands of peasants block roads in the central provinces to protest the rapidly rising cost of living. The President charges that leftist elements financed outside the country are trying to overthrow his government, established by coup in August, 1971.

Jan. 30—Some 6,000 farm workers barricade Cochabamba, Bolivia's 2d largest city, demanding General Banzer's resignation.

Jan. 31—Farm workers continue to defy the government. It is reported that yesterday troops dis-

persed the workers' barricades, leaving at least 9 dead and 30 wounded.

BRAZIL

Jan. 5—General Ernesto Geisel, the presidential candidate of the governing National Renewal Alliance, receives 400 of the 503 electoral votes. He will take office in March for a 5-year-term.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

CHILE

Jan. 12—The military junta establishes prepublication censorship over all magazines and newspapers.

CHINA

(See also *Japan; U.S.S.R.; Vietnam*)

Jan. 2—A dispatch from *Hsinhua* (official Chinese press agency) reports that a major reshuffle of top military leaders has been ordered by the party leadership.

CUBA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Intl Monetary Crisis*)

Jan. 28—In a series of meetings with Kuwaiti officials, French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert offers French arms and industrial investments for long-term oil deliveries.

GREECE

Jan. 24—After a 1-day trial, 2 Arab members of the Palestinian Black September organization are sentenced to death by a Greek court in Athens for killing 5 persons and injuring 55 more in a grenade attack on passengers waiting for a plane at the Athens airport in August.

INDIA

(See also *Yugoslavia*)

Jan. 13—In its third day in Gujarat state, rioting diminishes; over a dozen people have died during demonstrations to protest a scarcity of food and rising prices.

INDONESIA

(See also *Japan*)

Jan. 15—In Jakarta, thousands gather to protest the visit by Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan and Japanese economic imperialism. Violence and arson are widespread.

Jan. 17—Troops occupy the University of Indonesia campus.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

- Jan. 8—Official results of the December 31 parliamentary election are announced: Premier Golda Meir's Labor party has won 51 of the 120 seats in the Parliament; it formerly held 56 seats.
- Jan. 22—The *Knesset* (Parliament) approves, 76 to 35, the Middle East accord on disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian troops.
- Jan. 30—Golda Meir formally accepts President Ephraim Katzir's request to form a new Cabinet.

JAPAN

(See also *Indonesia*)

- Jan. 3—*The New York Times* reports that in Tokyo Japanese officials have expressed the fear that the 15-25 percent cutback in Japanese exports may aggravate Southeast Asian resentment toward Japan; there are about 6 Asian nations whose economies depend on supplies from Japan.
- Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira arrives in Peking for a 3-day visit for talks with Chinese leaders on trade and international relations.
- Jan. 7—The yen falls to 299 to the dollar because the Bank of Japan has withdrawn its support for the yen on the Tokyo foreign exchange market. The yen was formerly valued at 280 to the dollar.
- Jan. 8—In Manila, Tanaka confers with Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
- Jan. 11—Premier Tanaka arrives in Singapore for a 1-day official visit; he meets with Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew.
- Jan. 12—Tanaka arrives in Malaysia for talks with Malaysian Premier Abdul Razak.
- Jan. 14—Tanaka arrives in Jakarta for talks with Indonesian President Suharto.
- Jan. 17—Tanaka returns from his 10-day tour.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

- Jan. 8—President Park Chung Hee proclaims 2 presidential "emergency decrees," establishing emergency courts-martial and prohibiting criticism of the Constitution or demands for its revision.

LAOS

- Jan. 17—Representatives of the Laotian government and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao initial an agreement on the deployment of their armed forces to insure the neutralization of Vientiane, the administrative capital, and of Luang Prabang, the royal capital.

LIBYA

(See also *Tunisia*)

- Jan. 25—Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi arrives in Geneva to discuss the proposed Libyan-Tunisian merger with Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.

MALAYSIA

(See *Japan*)

MOROCCO

- Jan. 28—62 fugitives convicted in absentia of treason in an abortive coup last spring are sentenced to death.

NETHERLANDS, THE

- Jan. 12—Rationing of gasoline for private use becomes effective.

PAKISTAN

- Jan. 5—*The New York Times* reports that the Pakistani government has nationalized the banking, shipping, and oil distribution industries.

PHILIPPINES

(See also *Japan*)

- Jan. 16—Fighting breaks out on Mindanao Island between government troops and Muslim rebels.

SAUDI ARABIA

- Jan. 27—At a news conference in Tokyo, Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, Minister of Petroleum Affairs, says King Faisal "will take very important steps" in the direction of cutting the cost of crude oil.
- Jan. 28—In Tokyo, Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, the Minister of Petroleum Affairs, says that any cut in the price his country charges for oil must be made in conjunction with other oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf.
- Jan. 29—Sheik Yamani tells the Japanese his nation hopes to increase oil production when the Arab-Israeli war is settled, and says Saudi Arabian King Faisal will write personally to other Persian Gulf oil-producing states to persuade them to lower prices.

SINGAPORE

(See *Japan*)

SPAIN

- Jan. 4—Premier Carlos Arias Navarro and his Cabinet are sworn in.

SWEDEN

- Jan. 8—Rationing of heating oil and gasoline begins in Sweden.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

THAILAND

- Jan. 3—General Kriangsak Chamnand declares that the U.S. has withdrawn 3,700 troops from Thailand since September, 1973; it is expected that by the end of the week, U.S. troops in Thailand will number less than 35,000.

Jan. 9—In Bangkok, a crowd of 4,000 persons gathers outside the U.S. embassy and demands the ouster of the U.S. ambassador.

Jan. 28—A new constitution, completed by a drafting committee after almost 3 months' work, goes to the National Assembly for ratification.

TUNISIA

(See also *Libya*)

Jan. 12—In Tunisia, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, chief of state of Libya, and President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia announce, in a joint communiqué, that they have decided to merge and form a new state, the Arab Islamic Republic. A referendum on the merger will be held in each country.

Jan. 15—It is reported that Tunisian leaders are hedging on the merger with Libya following yesterday's dismissal of Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohammed Masmoudi, architect of the merger. The proposed referendum on the merger, scheduled for later this week, is postponed until the constitution can be revised.

TURKEY

Jan. 25—Bulent Ecevit, leader of the social democratic Republican People's party, becomes Premier; Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the National Salvation party (Islamic), becomes Deputy Premier. The 25-member left-of-center Cabinet is formed after party leaders sign a coalition agreement. The National Salvation party is the first Islamic party to share power since the constitution was secularized in 1928 by Kemal Ataturk.

U.S.S.R.

Jan. 15—Sergei V. Mikhalkov, chairman of the board of the Writers Union for the Russian Republic, asserts, on the Moscow radio, that Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Soviet author, should leave the country following publication abroad of *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956*, a critical study of the Soviet penal system.

The 1974 tour of Leningrad's Kirov Ballet is cancelled because of the energy crisis and reportedly also because of the "Panov situation." The Panovs, 2 former principal dancers of the Kirov Ballet, have not been permitted to emigrate to Israel.

Jan. 25—The Central Statistics Board announces economic gains for 1973: a 14 percent increase in grain harvest, an increase in industrial production of 7.4 percent, a 6.8 percent rise in national income over 1972. Real per capita income reportedly rose 5 percent over 1972, a poor year.

Jan. 28—The U.S. Defense Department reports that the Soviet Union conducted long-range tests of a new intercontinental missile with multiple warhead capability on January 25 and 26; this is the first long-range test of the missile.

Soviet Party Leader Leonid I. Brezhnev flies to Cuba on what is reported as a friendly visit.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Jan. 8—Prime Minister Edward Heath creates a Department of Energy to handle the fuel shortage.

Jan. 14—After a 5½-hour meeting, Prime Minister Heath and leaders of the Trades Union Congress fail to agree on a settlement for the coal miners' pay dispute. As a result of the miners' refusal to work overtime, Britain is faced with severe power shortages.

Jan. 24—Prime Minister Heath's appeal to the mine workers is rejected as the union leaders order a strike vote in the coal fields. As a result, a complete shutdown could come in as little as 17 days.

Unemployment figures released by the government for the last month show an increase of 123,040 unemployed. This is the largest increase in one month since World War II.

Jan. 25—The British Minister for Energy, Patrick Jenkin, announces the indefinite continuation of the 3-day work week. The government's previous hope for an expanded work week has been abandoned because of the miners' call for a strike vote.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber and Secretary for Trade and Industry Peter Walker report the conclusion of an "oil-for-goods pact" with Iran. Under the pact, Britain will receive 25 percent of her oil (an increase of 5 percent or 5 million extra tons of crude oil this year) from Iran. In exchange, Iran will import about \$240 million in textile fibers, steel, paper, petrochemicals and other industrial goods from Britain.

Jan. 29—Labour party officials issue a strong repudiation of the speech by Michael McGahey, vice president of the National Union of Mineworkers. McGahey, one of 6 Communists on the union's 27-man board, warned that if soldiers were used to move coal in the event of a strike, he would appeal to the troops to aid the miners.

Jan. 30—In an effort to avert a national strike, Heath suggests an immediate conference with all sides in the coal mine dispute, offering to discuss pay levels of miners relative to the pay of other industrial workers.

Jan. 31—Some 260,000 coal miners begin to vote on whether to call a general coal miners' strike.

Northern Ireland

Jan. 4—Voting 454 to 374, the council of the Unionist party votes against a proposal that Northern Ireland participate in a Council of Ireland; the Council of Ireland would be a consultative body providing links with the Irish Republic. Brian Faulkner, head of the Unionist (Protestant) party

and chief executive of the coalition executive, signed an agreement on December 9 with the Prime Ministers of Ireland and Britain to establish the coalition executive and the Council. (For the text of the preliminary agreement see pp. 128 ff.)

Jan. 7—Brian Faulkner resigns as chief of the Unionist party (the largest Protestant group) following a negative vote in the party's council on sharing power with Roman Catholics. He states that he will remain as head of the new governing coalition executive.

Jan. 16—Brian Faulkner returns from talks in Dublin; he says that he feels assured that Ireland will not seek unification with Northern Ireland without the approval of a majority in Northern Ireland.

Jan. 22—A protest demonstration by militant Protestants at the first session of the Assembly at Stormont to be attended by members of the new Protestant-Catholic coalition leads to violence and police intervention.

British Territories

Grenada

Jan. 18—The Governor of Grenada, Dame Hilda Bynoe, resigns following anti-government demonstrations and a dispute with Prime Minister Eric Gairy.

Jan. 29—American citizens are advised by the U.S. government to leave Grenada before independence day, Feb. 7. Increasing political and economic tensions are given as reasons.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Jan. 24—The U.S. Tariff Commission asks President Richard Nixon to suspend quotas until June 30 on wheat and flour imports; the measure is designed to protect the dwindling U.S. wheat reserves.

Jan. 25—In order to provide a "stabilizing effect" on wheat prices, President Richard Nixon suspends import restrictions on wheat; the suspension is to last for 5 months.

Civil Rights

Jan. 4—In a suit brought by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, a federal district court ruling applies the Voting Rights Act, as extended by Congress in 1970, to a northern state for the first time. The court rules that congressional and legislative districts in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn are subject to scrutiny for racial fairness by the Justice Department. In the 3 New York counties mentioned, the state may have to redistrict for congressional, state senate and assembly seats in time for this year's elections.

Economy

Jan. 4—The Labor Department reports that the un-

employment rate rose to 4.9 percent of the labor force in December, 1973.

Jan. 16—The Federal Reserve Board reports that a sharp decline in auto production, plus a cutback in the output of electric and gas utilities, created a significant dip in industrial production in December.

Jan. 17—The Commerce Department reports that the GNP rose at a rate of only 1.3 percent in the last quarter of 1973; 2 principal factors affected the slowdown—a drop in car sales and a decline in housing starts.

Jan. 24—The U.S. Department of Labor reports that wage increases paid to workers covered by the major collective bargaining pacts were sharply reduced in size in 1973 even though the cost of living rose sharply.

Jan. 25—Following a move of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of 2 days ago, 7 more banks, including the two largest commercial banks in the country, Bank of America and First National City Bank, reduce their prime lending rate from 9¾ percent to 9½ percent.

Jan. 28—Hawaii becomes the first state to institute gasoline rationing in a limited form.

The U.S. Department of Commerce announces that U.S. foreign trade shows a large and unexpected surplus of exports over imports for the year 1973. The surplus was almost \$1.7 billion as against a record deficit in 1972 of \$6.4 billion.

Jan. 29—Controls on dollars for lending and investing abroad are ended by the government because of the improvement in the nation's trade balance and the consequent strengthening of the dollar.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Thailand*)

Jan. 5—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ends 2 days of talks in the U.S. with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Dayan expresses the hope that Israel is now ready to take "the first step" toward peace with an agreement on separating Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal.

Jan. 9—The White House announces that President Richard Nixon has invited the foreign ministers of Canada, Japan, and 6 European countries to attend a conference on February 11 in Washington, D.C., to establish "an action program" for international energy problems. President Nixon has also sent messages to 13 oil-producing nations in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, inviting them to meet with the oil-consuming nations at a later date.

Jan. 21—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger returns to the U.S. He and President Nixon brief congressional leaders on the results of his Middle East trip.

Jan. 22—At a news conference, Kissinger declares that he expects the Arab oil embargo against the

U.S. to stop before the end of the 40-day disengagement period for Israeli and Egyptian troops.

Jan. 23—The House of Representatives unexpectedly votes 248 to 155 to refuse new contributions by the United States to the World Bank arm called the International Development Association, which has been the major source of "development assistance for 21 countries classified by the United Nations as least developed."

Government

Jan. 2—President Nixon signs a bill requiring states to observe a national speed limit of 55 miles an hour if they want to continue to receive federal highway trust funds.

President Nixon also signs the Regional Rail Reorganization Act to consolidate 7 major bankrupt lines.

The Federal Reserve Board reduces to 50 percent (from 65 percent) the margin, or cash payment, necessary for purchasing stocks on credit.

The Internal Revenue Service announces that it is "reexamining" an undisclosed number of President Nixon's tax returns. Last month President Nixon publicly disclosed his income tax returns during his first 4 years in office, revealing tax deductions that have been questioned publicly.

Jan. 3—President Nixon signs a bill providing a 2-step, 11 percent increase in Social Security benefits for 30 million Americans, 7 percent to take effect in March, 1974, and 4 percent to take effect in June. The new law also provides improved benefits for 3.4 million aged, blind or disabled Americans. An escalator clause provides for automatic increases in benefits after July, 1975. The increases will be paid for by raising the ceiling on salaries taxable for social security to \$13,200.

Secretary of State Kissinger, at a news conference at the presidential compound in San Clemente, California, declares that President Nixon will urge some 20 nations—the major oil-producing and oil-consuming states—to collaborate to ease the energy crisis.

President Nixon signs the \$5.8-billion foreign aid appropriation bill, \$1.1 billion less than the President asked for.

Jan. 4—In a letter delivered to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the Watergate committee), President Nixon refuses to release more than 500 tapes and documents subpoenaed by the committee. The President declares that such release would "destroy any vestige of confidentiality of presidential communications."

President Nixon pocket vetoes (fails to sign while Congress is in recess) the Urban Mass Transportation Act which would have permitted the use of

federal funds for buying local buses. In a "memorandum of disapproval," the President declares the act is "an antitransit measure."

Former Senator William B. Saxbe (R., Ohio) is sworn in as U.S. Attorney General.

Jan. 7—William E. Simon, director of the Federal Energy Office, asks 26 refineries to sell more domestic oil (cheaper than foreign oil) to independent wholesalers to help reduce the gap between prices charged by the major oil companies and the higher prices independent retailers of heating oil have been forced to charge.

The Senate Watergate committee files a suit in federal district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to order the President to comply with the subpoenas for presidential tape recordings and documents. The President has 10 days to reply.

Jan. 8—Two White House statements explain President Nixon's position on his order of an increase in federal milk price supports in 1971 and on intervening in antitrust suits against International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. It is denied that the President was influenced by campaign pledges by the Associated Milk Producers, Inc. It is admitted that he acted out of political considerations and the fear that Congress would act to raise milk prices even higher.

Jan. 9—President Nixon celebrates his 61st birthday.

Jan. 10—William E. Simon issues a statement declaring that investigators from the Federal Energy Office and the Internal Revenue Service will audit the price, profit, and supply records of every petroleum refinery in the U.S.

In a January 1, 1974, letter from President Nixon to Russell E. Train (head of the Environmental Protection Agency) released today, it is disclosed that President Nixon has ordered the impoundment of \$3 billion of the \$7 billion authorized by Congress for fiscal year 1975 for the construction of waste treatment plants.

Jan. 12—Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski declares that the White House documents that his office obtained by subpoena from President Nixon are under legal restrictions and cannot be turned over to the Senate Watergate committee; he declares that he is bound by the grand jury rules of secrecy.

Jan. 13—*The New York Times* discloses that in a report submitted by one of the White House "plumbers" group in 1972 to President Nixon, it was concluded that Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received secret National Security Council documents. The report was a summary of an investigation into alleged military intelligence operations inside the White House. Supposedly, White House documents on national security (taken from Kissinger's office

when he was presidential adviser on national security affairs) were leaked to the Defense Department.

President Nixon returns to Washington after an 18-day vacation in California.

Jan. 14—A panel of 3 judges in Maryland issues a unanimous report to the Maryland Court of Appeals urging the disbarment of former Vice President Spiro Agnew because he is "unfit" to be a lawyer. The panel, whose purpose is the recommendation of disciplinary action against Agnew, based its decision solely on Agnew's plea of no contest to charges of income tax invasion on October 10, 1973.

Jan. 15—The Federal Energy Office announces formal allocations of fuel for public services and industrial use at the expense of heating oil and gasoline for private cars. Federal Energy Office director William E. Simon releases details of a contingency gasoline rationing plan that provides for distribution of coupons to licensed drivers who are 18 or over.

The New York Times reports that a key White House aide, Frederic V. Malek, has acknowledged drafting a secret plan in 1972 to direct federal grants in ways to win votes for President Nixon.

A court-appointed advisory panel of 6 technical experts reports to Judge John J. Sirica of the federal district court in Washington, D.C., its finding that the 18½-minute blank on a subpoenaed Watergate tape was caused by at least 5 separate erasures and re-recordings, and not by accidentally pushing a wrong button on the tape recorder.

The New York Times reports that Richard G. Danner, an employe of the Howard Hughes organization, has told the Senate Watergate committee that President Nixon personally suggested sometime in 1968 that he solicit a campaign contribution from Hughes.

Vice President Gerald Ford, speaking in Atlantic City, N.J., criticizes "a few extreme partisans" who are "stretching out the ordeal of Watergate for their own purposes."

Jan. 16—It is established in court that the erasure of 18½ minutes of a key Watergate tape was made between October 1 and mid-November, 1973. This information is based on testimony concerning the date of purchase of the tape recorder that was allegedly used for the erasure.

The White House issues a denial that President Nixon was responsible for the erasure.

President Nixon announces the appointment of Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., as special assistant to the President for domestic affairs. Cole will continue to hold the post of executive director of the Domestic Council.

The American Petroleum Institute reports that oil imports fell sharply last week. U.S. gasoline

reserves have dropped to some 3.6 million barrels, a low usually reached only in mid-summer.

Jan. 17—Arthur Blech, President Nixon's accountant, discloses that the Internal Revenue Service is auditing the tax returns of the Richard Nixon Foundation in addition to the President's personal tax returns.

It is reported that Common Cause, a citizens' lobby group, has subpoenaed Richard Nixon, individually and as President, to find out whether Nixon's supporters disclosed fully all contributions and expenses in the 1972 campaign. The Common Cause subpoenas result from a suit won in July, 1973, under the old Federal Corrupt Practices Act that required President Nixon's backers to hand over all records of gifts and expenses.

Jan. 18—In a request from the bench, Judge John J. Sirica asks Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski to give "serious consideration" to holding a grand jury investigation into the erasure of 18½ minutes of a key Watergate tape and the alleged nonexistence of 2 other subpoenaed tapes. Sirica declares that because of the possibility of unlawful conduct "on the part of one or more persons, a grand jury should now determine whether indictments are appropriate."

During a television interview, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer admits that he received a file of unauthorized material taken from the National Security Council in the White House.

Jan. 19—In a radio address, President Nixon asserts that if Americans continue their voluntary conservation of energy, there will be no heating crises this winter or gasoline rationing in the spring. He promises that the price of gasoline will not reach \$1 a gallon.

Jan. 21—In Washington, D.C., oil company executives appear at a hearing before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations under the chairmanship of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.). They declare that the oil crisis is real, and has not been created by the oil companies.

Jan. 22—Ronald L. Ziegler, President Nixon's press secretary, declares that President Nixon will not resign, but will finish out his term.

Jan. 23—After the 3d day of hearings on the energy crisis by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senator Jackson declares that he has documentary proof that the Exxon Corporation cut oil supplies to U.S. military forces during the Middle East crisis in 1973 on orders from Saudi Arabia.

In an energy message to Congress, President Nixon recommends that the foreign profits of oil companies be more heavily taxed and that stricter anti-pollution standards for automobiles be delayed for 2 years.

The Commerce Department imposes quotas on exports of 4 fuels—motor gasoline, aviation gasoline, heating and diesel fuel, and heavy fuel oil.

The Department of the Interior issues a permit for the building of the 789-mile trans-Alaskan oil pipeline.

Jan. 24—Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, in United States district court in Washington, D.C., sentences Egil Krogh, Jr., the former head of the so-called “plumbers” unit at the White House, to 6 months in prison on burglary charges stemming from the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office.

Jan. 25—Federal Judge Gerhard A. Gesell says in a 2-page order that President Richard Nixon must submit his views in a signed statement explaining whether or not he is relying on executive privilege as a defense against the Senate Watergate committee’s subpoena for 5 crucial White House tape recordings; the subpoena was issued July 23, 1973.

The world’s largest petroleum producer, the Arabian American Oil Company, admits to a Senate subcommittee that it has refused to supply U.S. military oil needs around the world since October 21; this action was taken on instructions from Saudi Arabia, which is the company’s source of crude oil.

Jan. 26—Hearings on contributions to the 1972 Nixon reelection campaign are postponed by Watergate committee chairman, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.), “in order to make sure that no prejudice be done to the John N. Mitchell and Maurice H. Stans trial.” The trial is to begin in federal district court in New York on February 19.

Jan. 28—A former scheduling director for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, Herbert L. Porter, pleads guilty in U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., to a charge of lying to the F.B.I. in the early stages of its investigation into the Watergate affair.

President Nixon sends a special message to Congress asking for an 8 percent cost-of-living increase for educational benefits to veterans and legislation to increase all veterans’ pensions by cost-of-living adjustments tied to the automatic increases available to Social Security recipients.

President Richard Nixon names Arthur F. Burns for a second 4-year term as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

Jan. 29—California Superior Court Judge Gordon Ringer orders President Nixon to testify in person at the trial of former White House aide John Ehrlichman and 2 other aides who will be tried for the 1971 burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. A subpoena will be issued to the President in Washington.

Jan. 30—President Nixon addresses Congress and the nation in his televised State of the Union message. He proposes a 10-point program for 1974 and de-

clares he will not “walk away from the job the people elected me to do”

White House deputy press secretary Gerald Warren says the President’s lawyers have recommended that the President “respectfully decline to appear before the court” in the California trial of John Ehrlichman.

Jan. 31—A resolution requesting full constitutional authority (including subpoena power) to continue the inquiry into the possible impeachment of the President is unanimously adopted by the House Judiciary Committee.

Science and Space

Jan. 14—Skylab 3 astronauts surpass the 59½-day record for a manned space flight.

Supreme Court

Jan. 8—In a 6–3 ruling, the Court declares that grand juries may use illegally obtained evidence as a basis for questioning witnesses; thus, the apparent effect of the ruling will permit the indictment of an individual on the basis of evidence that would be inadmissible at his trial. This decision marks an important exception to the “exclusionary rule” that forbids the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials.

Jan. 9—In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rules that states cannot constitutionally require political party officers to take a loyalty oath in order to have a place on the ballot for their candidates. Specifically, the case involved the refusal by the Indiana state election board to list Communist party candidates for President and Vice President on the 1972 ballot on the ground that the party officers refused to file an affidavit stating that the party does not advocate the forcible overthrow of the government.

Jan. 21—Voting 7 to 2, the Supreme Court declares that public school systems cannot force pregnant teachers to take mandatory maternity leaves before “some firm date during the last few weeks of pregnancy.” Specifically, the case involves school regulations in Ohio and Virginia that require female teachers to take maternity leaves 4–5 months in advance of the anticipated date of delivery.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Jan. 20—A special joint session of the National Assembly votes to amend the Constitution to permit President Nguyen Van Thieu to run for a third term.

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 24—President Tito arrives in India for a 5-day visit.

UNITED KINGDOM
OF
GREAT BRITAIN
AND
NORTHERN IRELAND



AVAILABLE FROM Current History

Academic Year 1973-1974

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Dimensions of Poverty in America (6/73) | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia, 1973 (12/73) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> American Social Welfare in Perspective (7/73) | <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1974 (1/74) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Social Welfare in America Tomorrow (8/73) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1974 (2/74) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The People's Republic of China, 1973 (9/73) | <input type="checkbox"/> Britain in the Seventies, 1974 (3/74) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1973 (10/73) | <input type="checkbox"/> Canada, 1974 (4/74) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Nations of the Pacific, 1973 (11/73) | <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico, 1974 (5/74) |

Still Available

AREA STUDIES

- ☐ Japan, 1971 (4/71)
- ☐ Australia, 1972 (3/72)
- ☐ Canada, 1972 (4/72)
- ☐ West Germany, 1972 (5/72)
- ☐ Mainland China, 1972 (9/72)
- ☐ The Soviet Union, 1972 (10/72)
- ☐ India, 1972 (11/72)
- ☐ Southeast Asia, 1972 (12/72)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1973 (1/73)
- ☐ Latin America, 1973 (2/73)
- ☐ Africa, 1973 (3/73)
- ☐ West Europe, 1973 (4/73)
- ☐ East Europe, 1973 (5/73)

AMERICAN ISSUES

- ☐ The American Cities (12/68)
- ☐ Black America (1-1/69)
- ☐ U.S. Resources: A Tally Sheet (6/70)
- ☐ America's Polluted Environment (7/70)
- ☐ Options for a Cleaner America (8/70)
- ☐ Urban America (11/70)
- ☐ The American System of Justice (6/71)
- ☐ American Justice at Work (7/71)
- ☐ Improving Justice in America (8/71)
- ☐ Welfare & the New American Federalism (11/71)
- ☐ American School Finance: A History (6/72)
- ☐ American School Costs (7/72)
- ☐ Financing America's Schools Tomorrow (8/72)

CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

A sturdy, hard-cover binder at a reasonable cost will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. Each issue can be placed in the binder every month. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods.

ONE-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION: \$9.50. **TWO-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION:** 18.50.

NINE-MONTH SUBSCRIPTION: \$7.95.

SEVEN-MONTH SUBSCRIPTION: \$5.95.

SPECIFIC ISSUE PRICE: \$1.00 per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 65¢ per copy.

BINDER PRICE: \$3.95.

BULK SUBSCRIPTIONS (in orders of 10 subscriptions or more mailed to the same address)

1-year subscriptions: for 10 or more subscriptions: \$7.80 each.

9-month subscriptions: for 10 or more subscriptions: \$5.85 each.

7-month subscriptions: for 10 or more subscriptions: \$4.55 each.

CURRENT HISTORY • 4225 Main Street • Box 4647 • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER: your choice of 3 free issues.

- ☐ 1 year \$9.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ 2 years \$18.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Send me 1-year subscriptions. ☐ Send me 9-month subscriptions.
- ☐ Send me 7-month subscriptions.

CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

- ☐ Current History Binders
at \$3.95 each.

Name

Address

City State Zip Code

☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add 50¢ for Canada; \$1.00 for foreign.

All these offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Specific issue price and bulk subscriptions based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

2-74 ROM 2-28-73
AMBASSADOR COLLEGE
LIBRARY PO 35620
BIG SANDY TEXAS
75755